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ESSAY
RELIGION  AND  SOCIAL  COHERENTISM
Nelson Tebbe*
Today, prominent academics are questioning the very possibility of a theory of free exercise or
non-establishment.  They argue that judgments in the area can only be conclusory or irrational.
In contrast to such skeptics, this Essay argues that decisionmaking on questions of religious
freedom can be morally justified.  Two arguments constitute the Essay.  Part I begins by acknowl-
edging that skepticism has power.  The skeptics rightly identify some inevitable indeterminacy, but
they mistakenly argue that it necessarily signals decisionmaking that is irrational or unjustified.
Their critique is especially striking because the skeptics’ prudential way of working on concrete
problems actually shares much with the methods of others.  Part II then argues that the best
defense of religious freedom jurisprudence begins with an approach known as coherentism.  In
political philosophy, coherentism refers to the way legal actors compare new problems to existing
principles and paradigms in order to identify solutions that are justified.  The Essay then extracts
and emphasizes the social aspects of this basic account.  It contends that arguments about the
meaning of the Constitution appropriately reflect social and political dynamics.  The resulting
approach, social coherentism, describes a powerful method for generating interpretations of the
First Amendment that are justified, not conclusory.  This matters at a moment when some defend-
ers of religious traditionalism are suggesting that principled decisionmaking on questions of
religious freedom is impossible, and therefore that such issues should be largely surrendered to
political processes.
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and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
Writing on religious freedom often begins with an observation that the
field is in crisis.1  Scholars regularly say that the doctrine is deeply confused
and has not been successfully rationalized by anyone.  Even some judges have
critiqued the law of religious freedom as unavoidably messy,2 or they have
predicted that systematization will continue to elude the courts.3
One response to these assessments has become influential.  Skeptics are
arguing not only that the existing law is confused, but that decisionmaking in
the area is necessarily rudderless.4  They believe that deep and persistent con-
ditions of western thought doom religious freedom jurisprudence to contra-
diction, and that no defensible theory of religious freedom is possible.5
1 See, e.g., PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE xiii (2011) (addressing the “incoher-
ence of religious freedom jurisprudence”); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 1 (2013) (“The American law of freedom of religion is in trouble.”);
STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 10 (2014)
(describing “a constitutional jurisprudence widely regarded as incoherent”).
2 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 697 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(describing “[t]he unintelligibility of this Court’s precedent” on the Establishment
Clause).
3 See id. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[In borderline Establish-
ment Clause cases,] I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”);
Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (Calabresi, J.) (noting that
hard religion cases “defy exact legal formulas”), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
4 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 1, at 1–13; WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBIL-
ITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 8 (2005) (arguing that protecting religious freedom is “arguably
impossible” without intolerable inequality to nonreligious people); see also STANLEY FISH,
THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 11–12 (1999); FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF
CHURCH AND STATE 123 (1995) (arguing that constructive efforts are “doomed” and citing
Steven Smith); Stanley Fish, Where’s the Beef?, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1037, 1043 (2014)
(“[C]ases involving free exercise exemptions and the danger of establishment continue to
arise and must be dealt with, and there is no satisfactorily rational way of dealing with
them.”); cf. Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 155 (2014)
(“[T]he very notion of religious liberty—its terms and its value—has become an increas-
ingly contested subject [at least outside courts].”).  Smith is particularly influential in this
regard.  He has been called “the most penetrating and thoughtful scholar of religious free-
dom of our generation.”  Marc DeGirolami, Review of Steve Smith’s Rise and Decline of
American Religious Freedom, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (July 21, 2014), http://mirrorofjus-
tice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2014/07/review-of-steve-smiths-rise-and-decline-of-ameri-
can-religious-freedom.html.
5 Skepticism about the possibility of a coherent approach to the Religion Clauses is
contemporaneous with a broader claim that the commitment to religious freedom, and to
human rights more generally, only makes sense on theological grounds. See, e.g., Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious Freedom Irrational?, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1053 (2014) (book
review) (“[R]eligious liberty only makes entire sense on essentially religious philosophical
presuppositions.”); see also Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A Nonreligious
Ground?, 54 EMORY L.J. 97, 126 (2005) (“The point is that the ground one who is not a
religious believer can give for the claim that every human being has inherent dignity is
obscure.”); see also id. at 129 (“I am inclined to concur in [this] view[:] . . . ‘The essence of
[our] morality is this: to believe that every human being is of infinite importance, and
therefore that no consideration of expediency can justify the oppression of one by
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Their contention that contemporary implementation of the Religion Clauses
is unavoidably incoherent represents a significant obstacle to religious free-
dom jurisprudence today.  A response is needed, and this Essay begins work
on the most promising candidate.
Part I acknowledges that the skeptics’ critique has substantial force.  It
focuses on an example, namely the skeptical attack on pluralist theories of
religious freedom.  Pluralists argue that the religion provisions of the First
Amendment incorporate multiple values, such as individual autonomy to
practice religion without government control, equality among religions and
between religion and nonbelief, the separation of church and state properly
interpreted, government agnosticism on questions of religious truth, and so
forth.6  Unlike some others, pluralists argue that these values cannot be
reduced to any single principle or rubric.7  Pluralism represents probably the
leading perspective on religious freedom today—or certainly a common
one.8  I have applied a polyvalent method in previous work.9
Skeptics argue that pluralism cannot avoid significant indeterminacy of
outcomes.  Moreover and relatedly, they argue that it cannot resolve disputes
without resorting to conclusory argumentation or ipse dixit-ism.  And there-
fore they believe that decisions taken by pluralists will necessarily be unwar-
ranted.  The argument has power because the complexity of decisionmaking
in this area does seem to allow for a range of conclusions in many cases.  Of
course, this is a problem for much of constitutional law, and for law gener-
ally, but it is especially salient in religious freedom law at the moment.  And
although the skeptics levy their critique against all forms of religious freedom
theory, it has particular force as applied to the pluralists, both because those
another.  But to believe this it is necessary to believe in God.’”).  However, the skepticism
addressed in this Essay focuses on implementation of religious freedom rather than its
basic justification.
6 For examples and citations, see infra note 29.
7 See, e.g., 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND
FAIRNESS 6 (2006) (critiquing approaches to religious freedom that treat equality as the
“single overarching value”).
8 See infra note 29.  The term pluralism has been adopted by several experts, includ-
ing some who identify with the label.  It sometimes forms part of a typology that divides
theories of religious freedom into three categories: singularism, which proposes one rubric
or value that is capable of rationalizing the jurisprudence; pluralism, which rejects that
possibility and argues that only plural values can make sense of the doctrine in an attractive
way; and skepticism, which rejects the possibility of rationalizing the doctrine. See, e.g.,
MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 11–12 (2013) (adopting a plu-
ralist approach and setting it off against monist and skeptical theories); see also GREENA-
WALT, supra note 7, at 6–7 (embracing a pluralist approach, while also noting that many
“condemn judicial work as incoherent or irrational”); HORWITZ, supra note 1, at xxvii (con-
trasting theories of religious freedom that “focus[ ] on a single liberal principle” with
“more eclectic” approaches); id. at 59 (describing “anti-theories,” which deny that any the-
ory is possible).  Although that typology is common, it is not clear that it is defensible—
many singularists end up relying on polyvalent considerations, at least in practice, and
many skeptics look like pluralists when they decide cases.
9 Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1127–30 (2011).
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theorists admit greater complexity than others, and because they represent
probably the most prevalent approach.
It is striking, and not usually noticed, that pluralists and skeptics actually
employ similar ways of working on ground-level cases: both carefully assess
the reasons on either side of an issue before making a judgment, both take
into account a wide range of considerations, and both avoid deducing out-
comes from singular formulas.10  And this Essay envisions a method that is
not entirely dissimilar.  What distinguishes skeptics is their critical evaluation
of this process.  They believe that it cannot generate legal principles, and that
it can only result in haphazard solutions.
So far, pluralists have not formulated an entirely satisfying answer to the
skeptics’ critique.  Kent Greenawalt, who is among the leading pluralists and
a primary target of skeptics like Steven Smith, has said only that in hard cases
reasons run out.11  In those cases, Greenawalt chooses a particular outcome
because the reasons behind it simply “seem” stronger than reasons support-
ing the alternatives.12  Part II aims to supplement that response.  It argues for
an approach to religious freedom that is capable of generating conclusions
that are rationally justified, even in hard cases.  To defend against the skepti-
cal attack, no more is required—it is not necessary to go further and show
that determinate outcomes can be identified in all cases.13
The best defense of religious freedom begins with coherentism.
Inspired by moral philosophy, where it is common if not mainstream, coher-
entism offers an account of how people properly resolve new problems by
comparing them to existing cases and principles.14  When constitutional
actors encounter a new question or situation, they ask whether a given result
fits together with their considered convictions, both about correct resolu-
tions of more familiar cases and about abstract tenets.  Working back and
forth among these elements, they seek a solution that achieves coherence.  If
they succeed, then the solution qualifies as warranted.
10 See infra text accompanying note 64.
11 Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses: Reflections on Some
Critiques, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131, 1144 (2010) (“[V]ery often, reason . . . does not get us
to the end of the line.”).
12 Id.
13 A great deal depends on how the charge of conclusory argumentation, ipse dixit-ism,
or irrationality is understood.  Here, it is taken to mean that outcomes are not morally
justifiable, meaning that they are not supportable by reasons.  Section II.C considers other
possible meanings.
14 See Norman Daniels, Reflective Equilibrium, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011) (“The method of reflective equilibrium has been advo-
cated as a coherence account of justification (as contrasted with an account of truth) in
several areas of inquiry, including inductive and deductive logic as well as ethics and politi-
cal philosophy.”).  As used in this Essay, the term “coherentism” describes a process
designed to generate a conclusion is justified or warranted, rather than one that is true.
For more on the distinction between claims of truth, knowledge, and moral justification
see infra text accompanying notes 93–95.
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This Essay articulates a version of reflective equilibrium or coherentism
that offers an attractive alternative to skepticism.  Coherentism also rational-
izes and justifies what many theorists are already doing in practice.  Moreo-
ver, it has a recognized application to law—it shows how constitutional
determinations, in particular, can count as morally warranted.  It has concep-
tual bite because (and insofar as) it defends against the skeptical claim that
conclusions on questions of religious freedom law will be necessarily con-
clusory or ad hoc.  Though the Essay offers only a method for thinking about
these disputes, and not a substantive theory of religious freedom, it needs to
do nothing more to accomplish its purpose, which, again, is to show that
thoroughgoing skepticism regarding religious freedom is wrongheaded.15
Underemphasized in the philosophical literature on coherentism, how-
ever, is a full appreciation for social and political dynamics.  Citizens reason
through problems in a situated way.  Paradigms and precepts, to which actors
compare the conflict before them, are made salient by cultural develop-
ments, which also limit the range of appropriate outcomes.  Especially for
constitutional law, these influences are salutary because they work to vindi-
cate a commitment to democratic responsiveness.  They also help to limit the
problem of indeterminacy.  So while a social aspect may not be appropriate
for all fields of inquiry—scientific disciplines, for example—it should be
included in constitutional methods.
Social coherentism does not eliminate unpredictability of outcomes,
however.  Nor does it offer a moral ontology—an account of what is real or
true.  Nor does it count as a theory of moral epistemology—of how we know
what is good or true.16  It has a different and more modest aspiration than
any of these, namely to defend a common way of solving legal problems.  It
argues that complex decisionmaking on questions of legal interpretation can
count as justified, where “justified” means backed by reasons, rather than
conclusory or ad hoc.  A moral conclusion that is justified or warranted17 has
persuasive power because of the reasoning behind it.  Sometimes arguments
must be confronted, even though power politics and private interests are also
at play, simply because they carry force.  Convincing each other, not just con-
testation, becomes necessary.
And social coherentism does generate criteria for critiquing some judg-
ments.  If a legal conclusion cannot be harmonized with principles or prece-
dents that are authoritative within constitutional practice, then it fails to
satisfy social coherentism and it is unwarranted.  Below, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.18 serves as an example of a decision that was discontinuous with
the Court’s precedent and therefore could not count as morally or legally
justified.19
15 For sources, see infra notes 134–35.
16 For more on this distinction, see text accompanying notes 93–95.
17 The adjectives “justified” and “warranted” are used interchangeably here.
18 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
19 See infra Section II.C.
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Of course, people who use this approach will still disagree about
whether a particular outcome is defensible or not.  This is a feature, rather
than a defect, of the approach.  Defenders of Hobby Lobby have arguments
that they believe make the Court’s conclusion consistent with precedent and
principle.  Conclusions can be conflicting but still justifiable, meaning
backed by reasons.  And people can disagree about whether a result is even
warranted.  Social coherentism cannot and does not resolve those conflicts—
only ongoing efforts to persuade each other can do that.  Its aim is simply to
show that defensible arguments can be made, and to provide an understand-
ing of their criteria and conditions.20
Skeptics might still object that social coherentism cannot count as a the-
ory because it cannot eliminate irrationality.  When someone chooses out-
come X over Y in a close case, she cannot give a reason for that choice itself,
even if she can give reasons that support both X and Y.  Part II concludes by
offering three responses.  First, we should distinguish between two meanings
of irrationality (at the very least).  While no approach can escape the first,
which demands determinate outcomes for every case, social coherentism suc-
cessfully avoids the other meaning, which asks for justified results.21  Second,
the Essay argues that instances of arguable irrationality are rare—several of
the skeptics’ own examples do not actually present such situations, and even
their core illustrations do not involve unreason.22
Finally, Part II contends that we should focus on conceptual yield and
ask what is really at stake in the skeptics’ claims of irrationality.  Two fears
turn out to underlie those charges: bias and arbitrariness.  But social coher-
entism is not disproportionately exposed to either of those dangers.  In fact,
coherentism understood from a social perspective is less vulnerable to those
risks than it is without that perspective.  Reflecting on how our beliefs fit
together works to combat bias and arbitrariness.  Moreover, the historical
and political contestation that shapes our reflection limits both risks.
In sum, Part I of this Essay shows that the skeptics have a point: leading
theorists of religious freedom can do more to defend their recommendations
as not conclusory or unwarranted.  Part II then argues that social coherent-
ism provides an account of how constitutional decisions can justifiably be
made under such conditions.
20 Specifying the boundaries of social coherence in religious freedom law generally,
and within its subdivisions, exceeds the scope of this Essay, which first sets out to propose a
methodological defense and framework.  A subsequent book will take up the more
detailed work of setting out ramifications in specific legal domains. See NELSON TEBBE,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (in contract, Harvard University Press).
21 Here, it may be helpful to distinguish between intra-personal indeterminacy, which
coherentism denies is inevitable, and inter-personal disagreement, which coherentism rec-
ognizes as a source of unpredictability in legal outcomes. See Micah Schwartzman, The
Completeness of Public Reason, 3 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 191, 192–93 (2004) (following Gerald
Gaus in distinguishing between “indeterminacy,” which is internal to a particular deci-
sionmaker and is avoidable, and “inconclusiveness,” which results from rational disagree-
ment among actors and is “a permanent feature of liberal politics”).
22 See infra Section II.D.
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The Conclusion argues that this account is needed today, when skeptics
are arguing that irrationality surrounding the Religion Clauses provides a
reason to leave more religious freedom disputes to political processes, includ-
ing in local jurisdictions.23  If they succeed in that argument, minorities
could be exposed to majoritarian forces in regions of the country that are
dominated by religious traditionalists.  And that could happen without resis-
tance from constitutional law, whether in courts or outside them.24
Although social coherentism sometimes generates results that do not match
particular political impulses—for example, it provides some support for the
notion that religion sometimes does and should have a special place in con-
stitutional law25—it offers a needed account of how citizens can and should
argue about religious freedom.
I. THE SKEPTICS’ CRITIQUE
This Part acknowledges that the skeptics have identified a genuine prob-
lem with a leading theory of religious freedom, pluralism.  Although they
argue more broadly that all theories necessarily will fail, their attack is espe-
cially significant when directed against pluralism, which is common among
scholars across the political spectrum.  Section A describes pluralism by
focusing on Kent Greenawalt, who is one of its most prominent advocates.  A
focus on Greenawalt makes sense not just because of his stature, but because
his work has been a primary target for skeptics.
Pluralism has drawn the critique that it underdetermines outcomes, as
Section B explains.  Once the relevant concerns have been identified, there is
no obvious way to determine which should govern in a given case, especially
when it conflicts with others.  Decisionmaking thus can seem patternless and
even biased.  Personal preferences and social interests are thought to have
worrisome latitude to influence results where legal authorities do not dictate
discrete outcomes.  As noted above, Greenawalt has been critiqued along
these lines by Steven Smith, the influential and impressive skeptic.26  Smith
admires the way that Greenawalt carefully analyzes the arguments on either
side of a difficult question, but he thinks that ultimately Greenawalt simply
chooses the side of the argument that seems strongest to him.27  Smith
23 See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
24 See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
25 For critiques of the notion that religion deserves special constitutional solicitude,
see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 52 (2007), BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013), and Micah Schwartz-
man, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012).
26 Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1869, 1893 (2009) (book review) (calling Greenawalt’s prescriptions “highly con-
clusory” before softening that charge).
27 Id. at 1895 (calling Greenawalt’s defense of basic values “conclusory”).
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describes Greenawalt’s approach as conclusory, ad hoc, or an exercise in ipse
dixit-ism.28
Section C argues that this critique of pluralism has power.  Greenawalt
himself has not provided the strongest possible response.  Without a convinc-
ing account, the process of identifying and applying the values involved in a
constitutional decision can seem incomplete or rudderless.  That sets up Part
II, which aims to provide a more compelling account of how the jurispru-
dence properly works in practice.
A. Pluralism
Pluralists recognize that religious freedom doctrine cannot be explained
or guided by reference to a single value, and consequently they incorporate
multiple commitments.29  Among those may be: evenhandedness among
faiths and between belief and nonbelief, liberty of individual belief and
observance from government control, separation between religion and gov-
ernment, latitude for religious institutions to conduct internal affairs,
preventing religion and government from corrupting one another, and
avoiding political division along religious lines.30  Not all of these values are
implicated in every case, nor does every dispute necessarily involve more than
one, but neither can any single principle generate results that are attractive
and workable across the full range of religious freedom questions.  Managing
competing considerations is as necessary as it is difficult for them.31
28 Id. at 1906 (“[T]he various pronouncements of judges and scholars in this domain
come to look like a thinly veiled exercise in ipse dixit.”).  But Smith is far from alone in this
sort of critique of pluralism.  Koppelman, for example, also thinks that Greenawalt is
driven partly by unstated values.  Andrew Koppelman, Religious Establishment and Autonomy,
25 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 291 (2008) (“[A]utonomy is a mask for other concerns that
Greenawalt is reluctant, for respectable but ultimately unpersuasive reasons, to spell out.”).
29 See, e.g., DEGIROLAMI, supra note 8, at 3 (“[T]he values which swirl around the con-
flicts of religious liberty are incompatible and incommensurable.”); 2 KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 1 (2008) (“Neither free
exercise nor nonestablishment is reducible to any single value; many values count.”); HOR-
WITZ, supra note 1, at xxvii; STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS LEFT AND CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS 2–3 (2009) (“[T]he religion clauses are supported by pluralistic foundations.”);
Alan Brownstein, Why Conservatives, and Others, Have Trouble Supporting the Meaningful
Enforcement of Free Exercise Rights, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 925, 929 (2010) (“[R]eligion is
a multidimensional constitutional interest which subsumes and implicates several indepen-
dently recognized constitutional values.”).
30 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 7–13 (listing and describing non-establish-
ment values); SHIFFRIN, supra note 29, at 20–23 (delineating free exercise values); id. at
28–40 (describing Establishment Clause values).
31 Because that choice can entail costs, some pluralists have described themselves as
pessimists or tragedians. See, e.g., DEGIROLAMI, supra note 8, at 3 (emphasizing the “tragic”
aspects of many religious freedom disputes); HORWITZ, supra note 1, at xxv (noting the
“tragic choices” that religious freedom jurisprudence entails).  They believe that trading
off values against one another can involve regret, because something of worth will be sacri-
ficed in difficult cases.  Other pluralists are more sanguine. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra
note 29, at 6–7 (noting that his pluralism makes him hesitant to condemn judicial work).
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As an example of pluralism, consider how Greenawalt addresses the
question of whether government may isolate religious actors for denials of
support without offending the Constitution—the issue of excluding relig-
ion.32  Sometimes courts consider such denials to be harmless non-subsi-
dies,33 but other times they find them to involve impermissible
discrimination on the basis of religion.34  Characteristically, Greenawalt does
not adopt any single approach to the entire category, and even within subcat-
egories he offers recommendations that are nuanced.  Consider his treat-
ment of just one issue: equal access by private religious groups to public
educational facilities.
Greenawalt endorses most of the equal access cases, which prohibit the
government from barring religious speakers from public facilities once it
opens them up for private speech.35  But he stops short of fully embracing
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, a decision that
required the University of Virginia to fund an evangelical newspaper in the
same way as other student publications.36  Greenawalt questions the Court’s
decision in that case because he believes that cash aid for core religious advo-
cacy, which was at issue in Rosenberger, ought to be distinguished from equal
access to state facilities, which was the subject of previous cases.  Even though
cash aid is a form of government support like access to public facilities, it
presents a more serious danger to non-establishment because of its fungibil-
ity.  Had the Court appreciated that difference, it would have permitted the
university to defund the religious publication—and it might even have
required it to do so under the Establishment Clause.37
Greenawalt also criticizes Good News Club v. Milford Central School, where
the Supreme Court required a school to include a Christian club when it
opened up the school building after hours to other groups that promoted
“moral and character development.”38  For him, three differences separate
that situation from other equal access cases: the case concerned elementary
students, who are particularly impressionable; it involved evangelization by
an outside group; and it protected meetings that began directly after the
32 For an analysis of the general problem, see Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1263 (2008).  For further discussion of Greenawalt’s handling of the topic, see
Nelson Tebbe, Eclecticism, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 317, 318–19 (2008).
33 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
34 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
35 GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 194–206 (discussing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819; Capi-
tol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981)). But see Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2011)
(upholding New York City’s exclusion of worship services from public school buildings
after hours, a policy that had been challenged on free speech grounds).
36 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
37 GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 203–04.
38 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 105, 108, 111 (2001).
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school day.39  Under those circumstances, school administrators should have
had discretion to conclude that students would feel pressured to attend.
Whether his conclusions are correct is not the issue here.  Rather, these
examples serve to show how pluralism works in practice.  In Greenawalt’s
discussions, much depends on the particular circumstances, because differ-
ent facts can trigger distinctive constitutional values, and in divergent ways.
In fact, his sensitivity to complexity extends well beyond the ideals that he
outlines in his theoretical introduction to the Establishment Clause.40  In
practice, it includes many non-ideal factors such as pragmatic and political
considerations.  Greenawalt also takes an eclectic approach to methods of
constitutional interpretation without addressing the subject extensively.41
Given this complexity, it is not surprising that the skeptics have critiqued
the approach as not just eclectic but erratic, as detailed in the next Section.
What is genuinely striking is that skeptics and pluralists end up applying a
similar method in concrete cases.42  What separates skeptics from pluralists is
their normative assessment of that method.
B. The Skeptics’ Critique
Skeptics believe that religious freedom doctrine is afflicted by an inco-
herence that is unavoidable.  Problems endemic to the area doom all efforts
to rationalize the jurisprudence.  Constitutional decision makers can only
muddle through, seeking modus vivendi solutions to particular problems.
Necessarily, these decisions will be indefensible on the level of reasoned
principle.
Interestingly, skeptics can be found among political progressives as well
as among political conservatives.  Some skeptics envision an expanded role
for religion in public life and robust protection for observance,43 while
others support a muscular interpretation of non-establishment and robust
39 GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 206.
40 Beyond ideals, Greenawalt seems interested in factors such as public opinion—
recall his reference to political feasibility—and feasibility of implementation, given the cur-
rent makeup of the Court. Id. at 432.
41 Greenawalt’s decision not to emphasize constitutional interpretation in the religion
volumes left commentators wondering. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Kent Greenawalt’s Elusive
Constitution, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 301, 301–07 (2008) (asking what method of constitu-
tional interpretation Greenawalt is using).  Since then, Greenawalt has embarked on a
multi-volume project on interpretation. KENT GREENAWALT, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITU-
TION (2015); KENT GREENAWALT, LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2010);  KENT GREENAWALT, STATU-
TORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION (2013).
42 See infra text accompanying notes 64–66.
43 See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY 82 (2001) (pressing for stronger
free exercise protection and weaker non-establishment barriers); Paul Horwitz, More “Viti-
ating Paradoxes”: A Response to Steven D. Smith—and Smith, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 943, 945–46
(2014) (comparing Smith’s brand of skeptical religious traditionalism to a conservative
version of critical legal studies).
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protection for religious minorities and nonbelievers.44  What unites them is a
conviction that no theory of religious freedom is possible.45
Steven Smith has offered a sustained and significant articulation of the
skeptical position.  Smith believes that the search for a coherent theory of
religious freedom jurisprudence is hopeless.  By “theory,” he means “an inter-
nally consistent set of principles capable of generating answers to questions
of religious freedom.”46  Ad hoc argumentation does not count, nor does
reasoning that generates only workable compromises.  To say that there can-
not be a theory of religious freedom is also to say that there can be no princi-
pled approach, for Smith.47  The two phrases appear to mean the same
thing.
Smith offers many reasons for this inevitability.  One is historical.  On
that account, the western intellectual tradition includes two political morali-
ties that are fundamentally at odds with one another.48  An older way of
thinking is theological and jurisdictional—it divides authority into sacred
and profane realms on religious grounds.  A newer conceptualization is secu-
lar—it foregrounds aspirations of justice or fairness toward citizens.49
Because both moralities are represented in American constitutionalism, and
because they are incompatible, attempts to interpret and apply the law to
concrete disputes cannot achieve consistency.  For example, religion receives
special constitutional treatment, following a belief that is widespread and
traditional, but the theological justifications for that distinctiveness have
been eschewed and cannot be replaced by a secular conception of justice.50
44 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 150 (stating a preference for egalitarian out-
comes); see also GEDICKS, supra note 4, at 7 (noting the incoherence of secular reasons for
religion exemptions); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 556–57 (1998) (argu-
ing against religion exemptions).
45 See, e.g., GEDICKS, supra note 4, at 123 (arguing that constructive efforts in the area
of religious freedom are “doomed” and citing STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 68
(1995)); id. at 124 (calling the effort to manage conflicting religious freedom values
“futil[e]”); SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 8, 150–51 (arguing that the category of religion is so
unstable that the endeavor of protecting freedom of religion as such is “impossible”).
46 SMITH, supra note 43, at 45.
47 See, e.g., id. at 46–47; id. at 55 (arguing that separationism cannot offer “any theory
or principle defining the proper scope of religious freedom”); id. at 57 (arguing that a
modus vivendi is the best that can be hoped for).
48 See id. at 52; see generally SMITH, supra note 1.
49 See Smith, supra note 26, at 1882.  This categorization resembles Gedicks’s distinc-
tion between secular individualism and religious communitarianism; Gedicks too believes
that the discourses coexist in the doctrine and yet are contradictory. See GEDICKS, supra
note 4, at 11–13.
50 Smith, supra note 26, at 1882; id. at 1883; id. at 1904–05.  Smith draws on MacIntyre
for some aspects of this critique:
MacIntyre shows how as older moral and religious traditions broke down, debates
about issues such as the justness of war, the permissibility of abortion, and the
tension between liberty and economic equality became what they are today: a
chaos of conflicting and incommensurable assertions.  In this context MacIntyre
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A related difficulty is that the principles offered by modern theories to
anchor the doctrine are not up to the task.  Equality among religions and
neutrality of government toward them are the principles most often invoked,
but Smith believes they are empty concepts.51  As an example, he criticizes
Eisgruber and Sager’s principle of equal liberty.52  Their theory “smuggles
in” criteria by which beliefs ought to be compared to one another—it holds
that we should equalize constitutional treatment of all commitments that are
“deep” and “valuable” without specifying what would satisfy each of those
criteria.53  Smith is not surprised that the results then conform to Eisgruber’s
and Sager’s substantive commitments, which remain unarticulated.  That dis-
qualifies equal liberty as a theory, for him.
Pluralism of values is no solution, for Smith.  Although theorists who
advocate pluralism admit to complexity and elevate it to the level of a theo-
retical commitment, they still purport to resolve disputes using a reasoned
process of interpretation and application of principles.  Greenawalt, for
instance, ultimately chooses the result that seems best to him, without justify-
ing the final decision.  Smith selects Greenawalt’s discussion of Good News
Club as an example, saying that it weighs various values on each side before
simply declaring which position is most convincing.54  That method uses the
language of principle to describe decisionmaking that must be driven by
something else, according to Smith.55
So how should constitutional actors make decisions?  Smith proposes a
prudential approach.  Some of what makes it distinctive is rhetorical—he
believes that dropping the pretense of principle will lower the stakes of cul-
tural conflict.56  Another part goes to the institutional differentiation
between law and politics, because many conflicts would be resolved by politi-
cal branches of government under his approach, rather than as a function of
constitutional law administered by courts, and that would allow both for
greater public say and for local variation.  Overall, Smith urges constitutional
argues that genuine political community is impossible, and that politics, losing
the dignity it enjoyed in classical thought, becomes a form of “civil war carried on
by other means.”
Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 149, 206–07 (1991) (citing ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6–7, 244, 253 (2d ed.
1984)).
51 SMITH, supra note 43, at 13–14 (discussing and endorsing Peter Westen, The Empty
Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982)).
52 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 25, at 52 (describing the core of “equal liberty”).
53 SMITH, supra note 43, at 18, 34–38 (revisiting “smuggling in”).
54 Smith, supra note 26, at 1893.
55 SMITH, supra note 43, at 65.
56 Id. at 67.  Framing a dispute in terms of principle raises the discursive stakes, for
Smith.  Talking that way makes the losers feel that they are on the wrong side of morality,
and it converts what might be squabbles into emotional conflagrations.  It also raises the
practical stakes, because resolutions of small fights articulate rubrics that are then applica-
ble much more widely—perhaps nationally, if the federal Constitution is being interpreted
and applied.
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actors to confront the sort of decisionmaking that they are already practicing,
under which disparate factors are taken into account in a way that is intuitive,
ill-defined, inclusive, and implicit.57
Yet another part of what distinguishes the skeptics’ prudentialism comes
from the substantive values that it ultimately endorses, even though they can-
not be required by the approach itself.  First, Smith advocates the return of
tolerance.58  Of course, the broad idea is that government should permit
activities of which it disapproves, but that disapproval can be vigorous and
can sometimes be accompanied by regulation, as long as it does not amount
to intolerance.59
Second and related, he allows open government recognition of the view
that America is not only deeply religious but also a “Christian nation.”60
Nonendorsement of religion by government therefore is a mistaken idea,
and expressions like the national motto, “In God We Trust,” are at once fully
religious and constitutional.61  Do these commitments follow from the pru-
dential approach itself?  Smith admits, and even insists, that they do not—
that is part of what it means for the approach to be pragmatic rather than
principled.62  He argues that if people view his recommendations as idiosyn-
cratic, that perception should strengthen his main argument that principled
solutions are unavailable, and that instead we should allow “the ‘living prac-
tices of the American people [to] bespeak our basic constitutional
commitment.’”63
A notable conclusion from this summary is that skeptics and pluralists
adopt similar ways of working in practice, despite their deep differences on
matters of theory.  Both evaluate the strongest arguments on both sides of an
issue before issuing an all-things-considered ruling.  Both take into account a
wide range of considerations, principled as well as pragmatic.64  Both think
that religion should be counted as special only some of the time, and that the
difference will depend on careful analysis that is situational and specific.
57 Id. at 56–64.
58 Id. at 96; see also Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 305,
306 (1990).
59 SMITH, supra note 43, at 96–98.
60 Id. at 68–69.
61 Id. at 69.
62 Id. at 82.
63 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS 174 (1965)).
64 Greenawalt considers his approach to be more prudential than rigidly principled,
although he confesses to relying more strongly on ideal reasoning than Smith advises.
GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 438 n.19; id. at 450 (seeming to endorse “Smith’s most
important practical conclusions” in favor of a prudential approach “in the face of doubts
about many of his conceptual claims”).  What bothers Smith is not so much that the results
differ as that Greenawalt purports to derive his conclusions from principles using a rational
methodology, whereas Smith himself admits to the influence of non-ideal considerations
on a rudderless method.  Smith, supra note 26, at 1904.
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Of course there are important differences, too.  For one thing, Smith
tends to recommend results that favor religion,65 while Greenawalt generally
falls on the secular or progressive side of more constitutional disputes.66
And the methodological disputes are real, including whether variegated deci-
sionmaking of this type is irrational.  How should pluralists react to that
charge?
C. Pluralism’s Response
So far, pluralists have not offered a satisfying response to the skeptics.
Greenawalt himself, considering Smith’s attack, has said only that at a certain
point, in certain hard cases, reasons may run out.  All we can do is “survey the
reasons on each side” and make a decision.  Greenawalt says, “I do not
believe there is some process of reasons that settles which side is stronger.”67
In those hard cases, we can only “rely on our intuitive judgments—judgments
influenced by our cultural heritage, particular upbringing, and professional
training.”68  In other words, reasons cannot support the ultimate choice in
every case, and therefore a theorist must rely on his or her intuition about
which set of reasons is more convincing.  Greenawalt puts it this way in con-
clusion: “[W]hat a critic might label ‘bald pronouncements,’ [quoting
Smith] I prefer to regard as my intuitive sense of the stronger side of an
argument, one that I admittedly cannot show convincingly to be correct.”69
This is not quite the same thing as conceding that reasons can never be
given for outcomes in religious freedom cases—which is one reading of the
skeptical attack—but it does come notably close to conceding that in some
hard cases, presumably including the most hotly contested ones, reasons can-
not support the ultimate choice among outcomes.  So at least for those cases,
the skeptical critique goes unanswered.  Greenawalt does not explicitly
acknowledge that this means his judgments in such cases are unwarranted,
but he does not attempt to refute that charge, either.70
An intriguing variation on the pluralist response comes from self-styled
“tragedians.”  These thinkers believe both that religious freedom cases can
only be decided based on plural values, which can and often do conflict, and
that there is no principled way of resolving such conflicts.  So they agree with
the pluralists about the complexity of considerations that are often in play,
and they agree with the skeptics that the result risks irrationality or arbitrari-
ness.  As a result, they believe, American jurists are in a situation of “tragedy,”
meaning that some values will have to be sacrificed in order to vindicate
65 See supra text accompanying notes 48–53.
66 See Smith, supra note 26, at 1890–91.
67 Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 1144.
68 Greenawalt has responded to Smith only by admitting that at some point in legal
decision making reasons run out and all he can honestly say is that the arguments for one
outcome seem stronger than the arguments for the other. Id. at 1144–45.
69 Id. at 1145.
70 He does suggest that relying on religious reasons would not lead to more determi-
nate answers. Id.  But that argument leaves intact the skeptical critique of his position.
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other values in real cases, and no good reason can be given for those choices.
What makes the situation tragic, in fact, is precisely that some values must be
sacrificed to vindicate others, but without justification from some master
commitment.71
Is there a better response available to the pluralists?  Can a wide range of
considerations be brought to bear in ways that count as warranted?  Or are
the skeptics right that no rational approach to religious freedom is possible
under modern conditions?
That question is not unique to religious freedom law—it affects much of
constitutional doctrine.  Perhaps religious freedom law is experiencing more
than its share of internal tensions for reasons that skeptics have identified,
including especially the shifting place of religion in American society and the
sharp divisions reflected in the so-called “culture wars.”  But it is also possible
that the dynamics around religion are not so different that they cannot be
analyzed using available tools of political morality and constitutional theory.
II. SOCIAL COHERENTISM
Part I acknowledged that the skeptics’ critique of religious freedom juris-
prudence has power.  In particular, it contended that pluralists face a diffi-
culty in that they ultimately rely only on intuition, not reason, at least in
certain hard cases.  But the problem is not confined to pluralists.  If there is
no way to recommend outcomes that is not conclusory or ad hoc, that endan-
gers all efforts to account for the law of religious freedom.  So far, theorists
have offered no compelling answer.
To depict a plausible and attractive account of how people can and
should operate under modern conditions, this Part begins with an element of
moral philosophy, variously known as the method of reflective equilibrium or
coherentism.72  At root, that way of thinking holds that moral actors properly
seek harmony among their considered convictions regarding concrete dis-
putes and among the principles that they have abstracted from those situa-
tions.  Solutions to new problems are justified if they cohere with those
existing convictions.  As this Part will argue, coherentism accurately describes
how moral reasoning often works in the real world, including in legal
domains.  Because it rationalizes what theorists are already doing in practice,
it supplements rather than supplants existing substantive theories of religious
71 See DEGIROLAMI, supra note 8, at 6 (2013); HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 306–07.
72 For citations, see infra Section II.A.
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freedom.73  Most important, it defends against the skeptical claim that deci-
sionmaking in this area can only be conclusory and therefore unwarranted.74
Yet this Part will also argue that coherentism should reflect the insight
that moral decisionmaking on questions of religious freedom happens in a
contextual way, influenced by developments in politics and the broader soci-
ety.  It calls this method social coherentism.  Actors do not randomly call to
mind real world situations that generate fixed moral conclusions.  Instead,
they select moral reference points that are made salient by influences such as
social movements, political parties, legislators, executive officers, media out-
lets, and civil society groups.  They arrive at conclusions about actual exper-
iences through conversation and conflict with other interpreters who also are
socially located.
After Sections A and B lay out those affirmative arguments, Sections C
and D confront objections.  In particular, Section C anticipates the response
that social coherentism does not do any better than previous “theories” at
avoiding patternless thinking, ipse dixit-ism, and unreason.  It answers that
whether it qualifies as a theory, or as rational, depends on what one demands
of a theory or of rationality.  In particular, the Section distinguishes between
two meanings of irrationality.  While no approach can escape the first, which
demands determinate outcomes for every case, social coherentism success-
fully avoids irrationality of the other type, namely the failure of moral justifi-
cation.  Outcomes are rationally justified or warranted if they cohere with our
considered convictions.
Section D then shifts the focus to payoffs.  What exactly is at stake in the
charge of irrationality?  At bottom, the worry seems to surround two possible
defects in religious freedom doctrine and scholarship: bias and arbitrariness.
Focusing on those concerns, the Section concludes that social coherentism
manages them relatively well.  Nothing about the approach is distinctively
vulnerable to either of them, and much about it suggests distinctively strong
protection against both.
Finally, Section D argues that the social perspective ameliorates several
problems with coherentism, familiar from the philosophy literature, includ-
ing the difficulty that the approach is too individualized or relativistic for use
in legal practice.  Commonalities of culture and history provide a base for
these conversations, so that legal actors are intelligible to one another when
they argue over the meaning of a particular constitution in a given society at
a particular moment in time.
73 Social coherentism differs from typical pluralism in several respects.  First, it is a
method rather than a substantive account.  Second, it does not deduce the answer to new
problems from multiple values one-directionally.  Instead, it looks to ground-level scena-
rios about which there is a high degree of confidence.  Also, although abstract principles
or values also must cohere with any warranted conclusion about a particular scenario, they
are subject to revision.
74 Much depends on how the skeptics’ critique is understood.  That existing theories
cannot generate outcomes that are justified is only one way of understanding that critique.
Section II.C will examine others.
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A. Introduction to Coherentism
Coherentism is a term with a range of possible meanings; here, it
describes a strain of philosophy that asks how moral judgments can be ration-
ally justified.  Against skeptics who believe that such conclusions must be
driven by intuitions or interests that operate outside reason, coherentism
provides a way of understanding how even complex moral judgments can be
defended as a matter of reasoned morality, not just pragmatics or politics.
Start with moral reasoning in daily life.  People try to make sense of their
views—that is, they try to harmonize their judgments about existing moral
situations with each other and with principles that they abstract from those
situations.  They try to articulate general principles that can explain their
judgments about specific situations, and they try to ensure that those judg-
ments resonate with judgments about analogous situations.  They seek coher-
ence, which bolsters all their conclusions.
When people encounter a new moral problem, they consider their ini-
tial impulse about the proper outcome.  They test it against principles and
paradigmatic cases about which they have come to have some confidence,
after examination.  If the judgment conflicts with those beliefs, it does not
count as warranted.  But that is not necessarily the end of the matter.
Existing conclusions may need to be reexamined in light of new situations or
new understandings of existing positions.  All elements of moral analysis are
open to revision in an ongoing process of reflection and testing.  When com-
mitments fit together, then they can claim to be warranted or justified
because they are backed by reasons.
Coherentism owes much to John Rawls’s method of reflective equilib-
rium.  Rawls famously said that reasoning about justice should begin with
particular convictions about which there is a relatively high degree of confi-
dence, after reflection.75  These considered convictions can exist on any level
of generality, from abstract principles to judgments about concrete cases.76
They are commitments that appear to be correct, after they have been care-
fully scrutinized.77
75 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20, 46–53 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, TOJ]; John
Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, in COLLECTED PAPERS 286, 288 (1999) [hereinafter
Rawls, Independence]; John Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHIL. REV. 177,
187–89 (1951) [hereinafter Rawls, Outline] (setting out a precursor to the method of
reflective equilibrium); see also Daniels, supra note 14 (same), http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2011/entries/reflective-equilibrium/; David Lyons, Nature and Soundness of the
Contract and Coherence Arguments, in READING RAWLS 141, 145–46 (Norman Daniels ed.,
1989); Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory, in MORAL KNOWL-
EDGE? 137, 141 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons eds., 1996) (describing the
influence of Rawls on coherentism).
76 Rawls, Independence, supra note 75, at 289.
77 A critique of reflective equilibrium is that it depends for its power on these initial
normative judgments, which cannot themselves be justified by the method itself. See
Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath, Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?, 24 PHIL. PERSP. 325,
353–54 (2010).  But that critique misunderstands the provisional nature of those judg-
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Actors proceed by working back and forth between principles and con-
sidered beliefs about real world situations in an effort to reach a reflective
equilibrium.78  As Rawls put it: “A conception of justice cannot be deduced
from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justifica-
tion is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything
fitting together into one coherent view.”79  Although Rawls was developing a
method for thinking about the basic morality of a political system—a “con-
ception of justice”—the idea of reflective equilibrium can be applied also to
moral reasoning by individual actors about particular problems.  If our sense
of the best solution to a problem withstands reflection, so that it fits together
with the rest of our considered convictions and the principles abstracted
from them, then it is warranted.
Although coherentism begins with Rawls, it does not entail his entire
theory.  This Essay defends only the idea that warranted judgments on ques-
tions of religious freedom are possible.
What kind of claim can be made if a state of coherence or equilibrium is
reached or approached on a given topic?  First, actors can argue with some
confidence that their judgments on problems within that topic are reasona-
ble, warranted, or justified.  That is, they can argue based on the process of
reaching coherence that their conclusions are not just conclusory or irra-
tional, but that they are grounded in reasons.80  Moreover, identification of
principles that have survived examination can give them a reason to con-
clude that “at least some questions about the subject matter have determinate
answers,” as Scanlon puts it.81  Therefore, the method of coherentism or
reflective equilibrium provides an answer to charges of irrationality, and to
related concerns that moral decisions are driven solely by interests or intu-
itions.  Providing a defensible account of moral reasoning is, in fact, its whole
purpose.82
ments and their vulnerability to revision through the process of seeking coherence. See
T.M. SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC ABOUT REASONS 83–84 (2014).
78 SCANLON, supra note 77, at 76–80; see also Rawls, Outline, supra note 69, at 187–89.
79 RAWLS, TOJ, supra note 75, at 21.
80 See SCANLON, supra note 77, at 80–81 (providing arguments that the method of
reflective equilibrium can ground claims that resulting conclusions are both subjectively
and objectively rational); Rawls, Outline, supra note 75, at 187–89 (describing conditions
under which the method of reflective equilibrium can ground claims that moral judgments
are “reasonable” or “rational” or “justified”).
81 SCANLON, supra note 77, at 78, 84 (“[A]n overall account of a subject matter can
provide assurance that some judgments about it have determinate truth values.”).
82 Charles Taylor’s concept of complementarity bears some similarities to the argu-
ment here.  Taylor argues that it is possible to defend judgments as nonarbitrary, even if
they involve conflicting values or goods, if the judgments “fit together” with a person’s
conception of an overall life plan, of what kind of person he or she is becoming.  Charles
Taylor, Leading A Life, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON
181–83 (Ruth Chang, ed. 1997).  What might separate the two approaches is that fitting
together, for Taylor, is somewhat mysterious: it means a “sense” that the chosen path reso-
nates with “the shape of our lives.” Id. at 183.  It also is not altogether clear that Taylor
means to claim that complementarity bolsters a claim that the decision is warranted,
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With that general account as background, consider eight clarifications
and specifications about the form of reflective equilibrium or coherentism
that is under construction in this Essay.
First, “fitting together” means not just consistency, but a stronger rela-
tionship of mutual support.83  Joseph Raz uses the example of someone who
holds two empirical beliefs: first, that John was seen going into Emily’s house,
and second, that John has long wanted to visit Emily.  Those two beliefs are
not just consistent; they are mutually reinforcing.  If one is challenged, the
other can be cited as support.84
Second, the notion of coherence is not static.  All commitments are
revisable in light of the others—none is foundational, and the system is
dynamic.  Old commitments can be reexamined in light of new ones.
Third and related, coherentism allows for sharp critiques of prevailing
legal arrangements.  It is not limited to rationalizing established rules, and it
should not be understood to have a conservative bias.85  Critique can be
based on a claim that a particular doctrine is unfaithful to a principle.  Criti-
cism can also take the form of a claim that established understandings do not
sufficiently account for right outcomes in concrete examples that might have
been overlooked or misapprehended.  Additional forms of critique are
doubtless possible, and they too could lead to a convincing charge of incom-
pleteness or incoherence.  So it is a mistake to assume that coherence theo-
ries favor existing rules.
Fourth, coherence or reflective equilibrium probably is not best under-
stood as a state that anyone is likely to reach.  Rather, it is an ideal that shapes
efforts to arrive at conclusions that are reasonably justified.86  As someone’s
commitments begin to cohere with each other, that person becomes more
confident that they are reasonable or warranted.  People are more likely to
approach coherent views on a particular subject matter, rather than on the
whole panoply of their moral views.  That coherence can bolster their conclu-
although he does argue that complementarity can ground a claim that the decision is not
arbitrary.
83 SCANLON, supra note 77, at 78, 84; see also Daniels, supra note 14, at 2–3; Geoffrey
Sayre-McCord, Moral Realism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 16 (Edward N.
Zalta ed., 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/moral-realism/
(“[T]he specific judgments are taken as evidence for the principles and the principles
reciprocate by helping to justify the thought that the specific judgments are accurate.”).
84 Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 277–78 (1992).
85 See Rawls, Independence, supra note 75, at 288–89 (arguing that the method of reflec-
tive equilibrium is not conservative); cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 99 (1986) (noting
the critical potential of his interpretive approach).
86 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 97 (expanded ed. 2005) [hereinafter RAWLS, PL]
(“The struggle for reflective equilibrium continues indefinitely.”); id. at 385 (“[Reflective
equilibrium] is a point at infinity we can never reach, though we may get closer to it in the
sense that through discussion, our ideals, principles, and judgments seem more reasonable
to us and we regard them as better founded than they were before.”); SCANLON, supra note
77, at 77 & n.14 (noting that, for Rawls, the method of reflective equilibrium is an ideal).
This observation is compatible with Raz’s view that coherence can be achieved locally, but
likely not globally.  Raz, supra note 84, at 310.
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sions on that subject, even if those conclusions remain local and provisional.
Moreover, what Raz calls “the untidiness of politics” is likely to frustrate
efforts at global coherence.87  But again, that does not mean that the meth-
odology itself cannot drive justified results in real cases.88
Fifth, principles play an important part in the method.  They can help to
bring together judgments about concrete cases, both because they can cast
those judgments in a new light, and because they can help to resolve new
problems.89  Nothing guarantees that principles can be found to account for
particular judgments in a particular area, in which case those judgments
should cohere merely as a matter of horizontal analogy.  Nor is there any
guarantee that there will not be multiple principles that govern a given
area—in which case a situation of moral pluralism will exist.90  But overall,
principles work to rationalize discrete commitments.
Sixth, reflective equilibrium has a recognized application to law and
legal problems.91  Laws contain ambiguities that either allow or require legal
actors to engage in moral reasoning in order to arrive at the best understand-
ings of those authorities and the best application of them to cases.92  What
87 Raz, supra note 84, at 310.
88 That reflective equilibrium is an ideal state we are not likely to reach also does not
mean that it is “a utopian vision toward which we cannot make progress.” TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 383 (6th ed. 2009).
89 SCANLON, supra note 77, at 78 (adopting the method of reflective equilibrium and
describing the role of principles within it).
90 Id. at 78–79; cf. Raz, supra note 84, at 310 (“[G]lobal coherence accounts underesti-
mate the degree and implications of value pluralism, the degree to which morality itself is
not a system but a plurality of irreducibly independent principles.”).
91 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Prob-
lem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 106 (1993) (“Coherence is more than a property of
law; it is the result of a particular way of thinking about the law.”); Raz, supra note 84, at
273–74 (exploring the relevance of coherence theories to legal reasoning).
92 See DWORKIN, supra note 85, at 52, 65–68, 96–98 (describing an interpretive
approach to legal argumentation that allows for the influence of conceptions of justice).
Of course, there is controversy about this basic proposition, that legal interpretation allows
room for (or requires) moral argument, but this Essay simply assumes it to be correct.
Defending that idea would take the argument too far afield, and it would mean rehearsing
arguments in jurisprudence that have become familiar.
Is Dworkin a coherentist?  On the one hand, Dworkin’s approach shares some attrib-
utes with coherentism.  Famously, he emphasizes fit and justification as criteria for consti-
tutional interpretation. DWORKIN, supra note 85, at 65–68 (defending fit and justification
as independent criteria); id. at 254–58 (same); Nicos Stavropoulos, Legal Interpretivism, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), http://plato.stan-
ford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/law-interpretivist/.  On the other hand, his approach
seems to differ from social coherentism in crucial respects.  First, Dworkin sometimes says
that interpretation should seek to reconstruct a single unified view of law that can be
shared by the entire political community, DWORKIN, supra note 85, at 225, while social
coherentism—at least as defended in this Essay—demands only that a given constitutional
actor achieve coherence from his or her perspective, which is likely to be shaped by social
location.  Social coherentism also assimilates disagreement as a fixed feature of democratic
politics.  Second, Dworkin usually treats justification as a top-down form of reasoning, from
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coherentism adds is a way of understanding how legal actors can arrive at a
justified conclusion about some new problem, without resort to intuitionism
or irrationalism.  If a solution fits their reflective convictions (about legal
principles) and conclusions (about analogous cases) then it is rationally
warranted.
Seventh, coherentism in this Essay grounds moral justification only.  It
does not provide an ontology, or an explanation of moral reality or truth.93
Nor is it necessarily best understood as an epistemology, meaning an account of
the conditions under which it is possible to know what is morally right.94
While it may be possible to build up coherence theories of epistemology or
ontology, nothing here depends on them.  An account of moral justification
is all that is necessary to defend the view that complex decisionmaking about
questions of religious freedom can qualify as warranted.  Skepticism would
require a deeper response if moral conclusions could only claim to be rea-
sonable based on some ontological or metaphysical basis, but there is no rea-
son to think that is the case.95  In fact, the method of coherentism is
designed to show how moral positions have force simply because of their
relationship of mutual support to specific judgments and general principles.
The final point requires further elaboration, because it concerns the
question of disagreement.  What happens when we reach (or approach) an
equilibrium that conflicts with someone else’s?  That possibility is not an
embarrassment for the approach.96  To the contrary, it is among its key fea-
principles to results (with some subsequent revision of principles), id. at 65–68, while
coherentism seeks mutual support among principles and paradigmatic outcomes.  For
assessments of whether Dworkin applies a coherence approach, see S.L. Hurley, Coherence,
Hypothetical Cases, and Precedent, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 221 (1990); Kenneth J. Kress,
Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear
Order of Decisions, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 369, 398–402 (1984); Raz, supra note 84, at 317 (arguing
that Dworkin is not a coherentist); Mike Dorf, Requiem for a Hedgehog: Ronald Dworkin R.I.P.,
DORF ON LAW (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/02/requiem-for-hedge
hog.html (Dworkin was a coherentist, not only as to justification but also as to truth).
93 See Rawls, Independence, supra note 75, at 289; Daniels, supra note 14, at 25 (noting
Rawls’s distinction between a coherence theory of truth and a coherence theory of
justification).
94 Daniels, supra note 14, at 24–25 (exploring the differences between reflective equi-
librium and epistemology).
95 DWORKIN, supra note 85, at 82 (arguing that “external skepticism” based on meta-
physics does not threaten moral claims); SCANLON, supra note 77, at 86 & n.27; cf. RICHARD
RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xv (1989) (“For liberal ironists, there is no
answer to the question ‘Why not be cruel?’—no noncircular theoretical backup for the
belief that cruelty is horrible. . . . Anybody who thinks that there are well-grounded theoret-
ical answers to this sort of question . . . is still, in his heart, a theologian or a
metaphysician.”).
96 Rawls himself thought that the question of whether a reflective equilibrium was
unique was beyond the scope of his project.  He assumed that a reflective equilibrium
would be the same across persons, or that disagreement would reflect familiar divides in
moral philosophy. RAWLS, TOJ, supra note 75, at 50.  Later, Rawls developed the idea of a
reflective equilibrium that was “general and wide.”  In a well-ordered society, every citizen
has achieved a reflective equilibrium that is general and wide, and therefore “full” or “fully
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tures.  T.M. Scanlon helps to show why disagreement is not debilitating in a
recent book, where he adopts a version of reflective equilibrium.  When we
find ourselves in a situation of disagreement, we should ask whether the
other person began with different considered judgments, or considered dif-
ferent principles, or resolved conflicts between principles and judgments dif-
ferently, and we should consider whether we should have made those
choices, too.97  If the answer is yes, then revisions are necessary.
If the answer is no, however, then the fact of disagreement is no reason
to change our views.  We can try to persuade the other person that our judg-
ments were better or we can accept our differences.98  Scanlon emphasizes
that what matters is not chiefly whether someone has reached coherence, but
rather the quality of the reasoning that led to that state.99  Their thinking
process is what gives their conclusions justificatory force.  Moreover, Scanlon
concludes from this depiction of disagreement that seeking coherence is not
just a way of clarifying what we think,100 but it is a “method for deciding what
to think.”101
Is it possible for conflicting conclusions to convincingly claim to be
coherent?  Of course that is possible—it characterizes situations of reasona-
ble disagreement.102  In a close case, some people will think that one side
should win, while others believe the other side should.  Each side may have
reasons for choosing its outcome over the alternative, because each may be
able to make a case for how that result resonates with its other commitments.
Each side can try to convince the other that it has neglected important prin-
ciples or paradigms, or each can argue that the other has drawn the wrong
conclusions from the common authorities.  Moreover, each side can argue
not only that the other side has made a mistake in reasoning, but further that
its reasoning is so discontinuous with precedents or principles that it is inco-
herent and therefore unwarranted.  Disagreement can happen on any level
of argument.
Whether ultimately only one side can be correct—whether there is, in
the end, only one right answer to problems of law or political morality—is a
question that is beyond the scope of this Essay, and quite far beyond it.  What
intersubjective,” meaning that each person takes into account the arguments of everyone
else. RAWLS, PL, supra note 86, at 384 n.16 (in the Reply to Habermas).
97 SCANLON, supra note 77, at 79.
98 Here again it might be helpful to distinguish between intra-personal coherence and
inter-personal conflict. See supra note 21.  That we disagree with someone else is no neces-
sary reason to conclude that our views are unwarranted.  For similar reasons, inter-personal
indeterminacy is not inevitable, whereas inter-personal indeterminacy is a feature of politi-
cal life that we can expect to persist. See Schwartzman, supra note 21, at 192–93.
99 SCANLON, supra note 77, at 79–80, 82.
100 As Rawls himself sometimes suggests. See RAWLS, TOJ, supra note 75, at 53.
101 SCANLON, supra note 77, at 78; see also Sayre-McCord, supra note 75, at 143–45 (argu-
ing that coherence is useful not just for discovering our beliefs that are justified some other
way, but for moral justification itself).
102 See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 88, at 25 (“[T]he phenomenon of
moral disagreement provides no basis for skepticism about morality or moral thinking.”).
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matters here is simply that both sides can come to conclusions that are
backed by reasons.  Section D will return to this deep problem, anticipating
the objection that although reasons can be given for both outcomes, no rea-
son can be given for choosing one outcome over another in hard cases, and
therefore the approach ultimately does devolve into irrationality.103  It will
refute that idea, suggesting that any understanding of rationality that has
practical yield in this context can be satisfied by a method of reflective equi-
librium or coherentism.
* * *
As an example of how all this works, consider Greenawalt’s discussion of
a basic precept, namely that governments cannot take positions on questions
of religious truth.  That commitment comes in for attack from Smith, as Sec-
tion D describes more fully.104  But in fact Greenawalt’s argument for its exis-
tence provides one of the clearest examples of how seeking coherence can
result in warranted conclusions.
How does he establish that tenet?  He methodically shows it to follow
from other principles that are widely observed, and he argues that it reso-
nates with actual case outcomes that have survived reflection.105  His first
move is to say that if the Establishment Clause prohibits the government
from recognizing a particular denomination as the official faith of the state,
something that is virtually uncontroverted in American constitutionalism,
then it follows that the state may not embrace a theological teaching of that
faith as true.  Based on that syllogism, he judges the rule against government
declaration of religious truth to be perhaps the best example of a principle
that is supportable by reasons.106  It coheres with a basic non-establishment
tenet, while fitting with correct case outcomes, and it is therefore is justified.
Greenawalt goes further, however.107  He also asks whether this same
rule (against government endorsement of theological truth) extends even to
official actions that are purely expressive and do not carry any coercive conse-
quences.  To test the answer, he offers a hypothetical in which a legislature
makes an explicit statement denouncing abortion and reproving women who
103 See infra Section II.D.
104 Smith, supra note 26, at 1893–95 (arguing that Greenawalt “never attempts any gen-
uine defense” of non-establishment precepts, including the ban on government endorse-
ment of religious truth).
105 Greenawalt himself does not claim to be a coherentist.  He explains that he reasons
“from the ‘bottom up,’” starting with discrete conflicts and “investigating conflicting values
over a range of issues.” GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 1.  Smith compares Greenawalt’s
method to Gratian’s “dialectical” strategy, although that approach has more to do with
considering arguments for and against a particular decision than it does seeking coher-
ence.  Smith, supra note 26, at 1888.
106 Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 1144.
107 See GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 53.  The surrounding chapter of Greenawalt’s
book serves to support one other principle as well, namely the rule against government
preferentialism among religions.
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choose to terminate their pregnancies, all on theological grounds.108  Abor-
tion remains legal.  He thinks that statement is designed to “condemn” those
women, and he concludes, “legislatures could definitely be engaged in estab-
lishing religious ideas even if the laws themselves impose no adverse conse-
quences on dissenters.”109  This exercise then supports the general principle.
Moreover, his discussion of the rule draws on the values he articulates in
the book’s introduction and throughout—they are mutually reinforcing.
Confidence in the principle supports those values and vice versa.  Govern-
ment pronouncements on religious truth conflict with virtually every non-
establishment value, including the concern about government incompetence
on such matters, the warning about corruption of both religion and state, the
danger of harm to equal dignity for adherents of disfavored views, and so
forth.110  Repeatedly throughout his discussions of particular controversies,
Greenawalt observes that the prohibition on government endorsement of
religious truth is driving at least part of the analysis.111  Far from worrying
that the principle is underdetermined by reasons—the skeptics’ concern—
he believes it is demanded by them.112  Greenawalt never mentions reflective
equilibrium.  But if this approach to supporting the prohibition on govern-
ment theologizing is not textbook coherentism, then it is at least compatible
with that method, and it serves as a nice example of how coherentism can
work to justify conclusions about principles and outcomes even in a complex
moral environment like the one surrounding the First Amendment.
B. Social Coherentism
Underemphasized in coherentist accounts in moral philosophy, how-
ever, is the role of social and political dynamics.  Actors do not randomly
recall real world situations that generate fixed moral conclusions, but instead
they tend to choose reference points that are made salient by social and polit-
ical processes.  Moreover, their reasoning process is influenced by the argu-
ments of others, in the sense that it most readily confronts judgments that
are prominent in the culture at that historical moment.
108 Id. at 59–60.
109 Id. at 60.
110 Id. at 10–13.  When Greenawalt lists these non-establishment values in the introduc-
tion to his book, he does so as a way of previewing what his “bottom-up” method will yield.
During the course of the discussion, he then induces those values from ground-level cases.
He also draws upon them to support his conclusions about other cases.  That initial discus-
sion is supported by the book’s whole apparatus.
111 See, e.g., id. at 15, 53, 57–58, 195, 445, 467 (stressing incompetence); id. at 493.
112 At times, Greenawalt seems to articulate something like a coherence grounding for
the principle and for religious freedom generally.  “[D]ifferent justifications [might] coa-
lesce behind a common principle that itself can be employed to reach decisions.” GREENA-
WALT, supra note 29, at 494.  Other times, the defense sounds more like the identification
of an overlapping consensus.  For example, “very different underlying justifications for the
religion clauses support the principle of nonsponsorship.” Id. at 494–95.
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Why emphasize a social dimension?  There are at least two reasons.  One
objective is to anticipate and disarm the argument that because moral rea-
soning is influenced by politics and interests, it cannot be justified.  Social
coherentism vigorously resists this conclusion, showing that arguments can
be shot through with power dynamics and nevertheless carry the force of
reasonableness.  People think from within social conflicts, not outside them,
and yet their reasons can carry the authority of principle.  Another reason to
highlight the social dimension is to make the point that the social embedded-
ness of arguments over constitutional understandings can help bolster those
interpretations’ popular responsiveness, and hence their democratic
legitimacy.
None of this means that constitutional actors must actively poll others
before coming to a conclusion.  It is not prescriptive in that way.  Rather, the
social aspect of the argument describes and defends how the method works
implicitly.
To continue with the example in the last Section, Greenawalt draws his
abortion hypothetical from the zeitgeist, and his conclusion reflects prevail-
ing mores.  He himself senses this influence and he observes that our judg-
ments are “influenced by our cultural heritage, particular upbringing, and
professional training.”113  Nothing about this is embarrassing, nor does it
necessarily entail bias or intuitionism.  Americans fix the contours of consti-
tutional morality in debate and dialogue with one another.  Of course disa-
greement persists, but it persists within parameters set by social, cultural, and
political forces.  And within those parameters as well, it is influenced by social
dynamics.
Social coherentism, as the term is used here, provides a method for
arriving at warranted conclusions to problems of religious freedom in the
real world.114  Moreover, social coherentism depicts encounters in which
people try to convince each other about correct moral and legal outcomes in
the context of contemporary life, with its complexity and contingency.115
113 Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 1144.  He mentions his own parentage, his religious
background, and his personal experiences of kindness among loved ones as important
influences. Id.; see also Nancy Levit, Practically Unreasonable: A Critique of Practical Reason, 85
NW. U. L. REV. 494, 502 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE (1990)) (noting, albeit in a critical way, that practical reason is “dependent on cul-
tural fabric, on social, ethnic, and geographic variations, and on historical traditions”).
114 It does not depend on “the priority of the moral over the political,” to use Bernard
Williams’s language, but instead it speaks to legal actors who are fully situated within social
dynamics and political struggles. BERNARD WILLIAMS, IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED 8
(2005).  Williams is right that it would be foolish to think that our moral convictions are
not the products of social and cultural conditions. Id. at 13 (“[W]e would be merely naive
if we took our convictions, and those of our opponents, as simply autonomous products of
moral reason rather than as another product of historical conditions . . . . This does not
mean that we throw our political convictions away . . . .”).
115 Compare Rorty’s argument that liberalism “is content to call ‘true’ whatever the
upshot of [persuasive] encounters turns out to be.” RORTY, supra note 95, at 52.  Rorty says
that Rawls and other writers
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Strong support for a social form of coherentism comes not only from
moral philosophy, where such considerations are still relatively underdevel-
oped in discussions of reflective equilibrium, but additionally from current
constitutional theory.  Looking there not only provides needed perspective to
philosophical accounts of coherentism or reflective equilibrium.  It is also
appropriate because, after all, religious freedom is a constitutional doctrine.
And the social aspect of this method reinforces constitutional law’s demo-
cratic legitimacy.
Popular or democratic constitutionalism describes a family of
approaches that embrace the role of a wide range of groups and institutions
in shaping constitutional understandings.116  Courts are important to consti-
tutional meaning, of course, but interpretation also happens in legislatures,
in executive branch offices, in political parties, in the media, in civil society,
and in social movements, among other places.  Court doctrines are often
shaped by interpretive arguments made in these other institutions and
through these other processes.
Moreover, their influence is appropriate because constitutional law
derives its legitimacy, in the long run, from democratic assent by the people.
That relationship is established not only through the formal ratification pro-
cess, and perhaps not even primarily that way, but also and instead through
popular mobilizations and political movements.  Similarly, constitutional
change happens not only through formal amendment following the proce-
dures laid out in Article V, but through myriad mechanisms of social and
cultural contestation that form and express the constitutional understand-
ings of the people themselves.117
Social coherentism assimilates this account of constitutional construc-
tion and change to moral reasoning that seeks a reflective equilibrium.
When legal actors ask themselves whether their position on a particular issue
would happily grant that a circular justification of our practices, a justification
which makes one feature of our culture look good by citing still another . . . is the
only sort of justification we are going to get.  I am suggesting that we see such
writers as these as the self-canceling and self-fulfilling triumph of the
Enlightenment.
Id. at 57.  It is instructive to compare social coherentism to the shift from epistemology to
politics urged by both Rorty and Williams, albeit in different ways. RORTY, supra, at 95; cf.
WILLIAMS, supra note 114, at 7–8.  Social coherentism simply takes no position on questions
of truth, at this stage in its development, and instead it insists only that conclusions arrived
at through the method deserve to be called reasonable or warranted.
116 For a definition of popular constitutionalism and an overview of its varieties see
Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 959 (2004)
(“In a system of popular constitutionalism, the role of the people is not confined to occa-
sional acts of constitution making, but includes active and ongoing control over the inter-
pretation and enforcement of constitutional law.”); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM 277–82 (2011); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism,
in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 25 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
117 Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819) (distinguishing mea-
sures adopted by states from measures enacted by “the people themselves”); LARRY KRAMER,
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
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fits together with their other convictions, they do not do so in a vacuum.
Instead, they select examples that are made salient by social and political
developments.  Moreover, legal actors encounter arguments from others
about how principles and judgments ought to fit together.  Finally, they real-
ize that their constitutional understandings must take into account doctrines
that are widely accepted, if their arguments are to count as interpretations of
the Constitution of the United States, rather than the charter for some other
system.  (To take a basic example, any interpretation of the First Amendment
that allows an official church cannot count as an interpretation of American
constitutional law, even if it might work for a constitutional democracy that is
otherwise similar, like Great Britain’s.)118
What happens when people disagree about the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, according to this perspective?  Crude political contestation may ensue,
of course, but efforts to persuade each other about the proper meaning of
the Constitution may also play an important role.119  Someone may argue
that her opponents have not considered all the relevant principles or para-
digmatic cases, that they have included irrelevant considerations, or that they
have reasoned in the wrong way—without sufficient reflection, or in a man-
ner that is motivated or interested.  Considerations of coherence may not
determine the outcome to any particular disagreement, of course, but they
can prove important.
C. An Example of Incoherence
As an example of a religious freedom decision that does not cohere with
basic principles, consider the Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.120  There, the Court held that a business corporation was exempt from
the contraception mandate imposed under authority of the Affordable Care
Act.  Because Hobby Lobby had a religious basis for its objection to providing
insurance coverage for contraception, it was protected by the federal Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), according to the Court.121  As a
result, Hobby Lobby was relieved of the obligation to provide health insur-
ance coverage that included contraception for its employees.
But this holding violated a longstanding principle.  Accommodations
cannot shift meaningful burdens from some private citizens, because of their
118 This is not the same as Dworkin’s criterion of fit, though it is similar in some
respects. See supra note 92 (describing the debate over whether Dworkin is a coherentist).
119 See BALKIN, supra note 116, at 331 (“[N]ormative argument about the Constitution
is hardly futile. . . . Arguments about what the Constitution means and who has the author-
ity to say what it means are important because they can persuade the actors in the system to
think differently.”); Post & Siegel, supra note 116, at 27 (“Americans believe in the possibil-
ity of persuading others—and therefore ultimately the Court—to embrace their views
about constitutional meaning.”).
120 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
121 Id. at 2759 (applying 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb4).
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religious beliefs, to other private citizens who may have different beliefs.122
That rule against burden shifting, which is also known as the third party
harm doctrine, has been articulated in free exercise cases.  For example, the
Court denied an exemption from social security taxes for an Amish employer
because of concern for the impact on his employees.123  There, the Court
explained that “[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial
activity as a matter of choice” they accept limits on their activity that cannot
be lifted where doing so would “impose the employer’s religious faith on the
employees.”124
The principle has also been articulated under the Establishment Clause.
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., the Court reasoned that “The First
Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own
interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessi-
ties.”125  It therefore held that Connecticut could not require employers to
accommodate the Sabbath observance of every employee, no matter what the
impact on others.126  The principle against harm to others has limits—it only
applies to harm that constitutes an undue hardship—but within those limits
it represents an important tenet of religious freedom.127
Although the Hobby Lobby Court acknowledged the potential harm to
employees, nothing in its opinion conditioned the result on an actual absence
of harm to employees.128  The Court ruled only that exempting the company
122 For a proposal regarding exactly when religion accommodations should be permit-
ted to harm third parties, see Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe,
When Do Religion Accommodations Burden Others? (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
123 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
124 Id. at 261.
125 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (quoting Otten v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir.
1953) (L. Hand, J.)).
126 See also Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 36–46 (2015) (testimony of Nelson Tebbe, Prof. of Law, Brooklyn
Law Sch.); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R. & C.L. L.
REV. 343 (2014); Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, The Establish-
ment Clause and the Contraception Mandate, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013), http://
perma.cc/A4ZTEW6S.
127 See Schwartzman et al., supra note 122 (arguing for an undue hardship limit on the
principle against harm to others).
128 The Court cast doubt on the third party harm doctrine in a footnote.  Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014).  But that language is dicta,
given the Court’s (erroneous) view that no harm to third parties would result from its
ruling.  Moreover, Justice Kennedy, whose vote was necessary to assemble the majority, was
clearer that the absence of a harm to third parties was a necessary predicate of the ruling in
Hobby Lobby. Id. at 2786–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[In America,] no person may be
restricted or demeaned by government in exercising his or her religion.  Yet neither may
that same exercise unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their
own interests, interests the law deems compelling.  In these cases the means to reconcile
those two priorities are at hand in the existing accommodation the Government has
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from the contraception mandate need not shift burdens to third parties,
because the government retained the power to craft a solution that would
extend coverage to employees another way.129
And in fact, the employees of Hobby Lobby were harmed.  Although the
Obama Administration subsequently formulated regulations that covered the
employees of Hobby Lobby, those regulations were not issued until over a
year after the decision was handed down.130  During that period, significant
harm was shifted to third parties.  Employees went without coverage, and
they likely suffered irreparable harm.131  Therefore, the Court’s decision
conflicts with a basic principle of religious freedom and is unwarranted.
Of course, there is significant disagreement about whether the Court’s
reasoning in Hobby Lobby is supportable.132  Proponents of the majority opin-
ion will argue that it is not only coherent, but correct.  Again, the fact of
disagreement is no embarrassment to social coherentism.  Its object is only to
identify the conditions under which moral and legal actors can claim that
their conclusions are justified and not conclusory or irrational.  What we are
seeing now, in the wake of Hobby Lobby, is a robust conversation about
whether the decision is reasonable and correct.  That debate is happening in
a thick social context that is riven with conflicts over women’s equality, repro-
ductive freedom, and LGBT rights.133  All of that is expected and salutary.  It
helps to ensure that the resulting settlements about the meaning of religious
freedom are shaped by democratic engagement.
designed, identified, and used for circumstances closely parallel to those presented here.
RFRA requires the Government to use this less restrictive means.”).  For a detailed critique
of footnote 37, see Micah Schwartzman et al., supra note 122, at 9–13.
129 134 S. Ct. at 2759–60.
130 Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed.
Reg. 41318 (July 14, 2015); see also Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartz-
man, Update on the Establishment Clause and Third Party Harms: One Ongoing Violation and One
Constitutional Accommodation, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 16, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2014/10/update-on-establishment-clause-and.html.
131 See Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 607–08 (7th Cir. 2015) (detailing the
health benefits to women of inexpensive contraception coverage, including the avoidance
of unintended pregnancies, which are associated with other health problems and reduced
participation in economic, social, and political life); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 257–64 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (same); Marty Lederman, Hobby
Lobby Part VII: Hobby Lobby’s Arguments on Compelling Interest and the Alleged Exemption “Hon-
eycomb”, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 17, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/02/hobby-
lobby-part-vii-hobby-lobbys.html (arguing that depriving employees of coverage even for
claimed abortifacients will result in unwanted pregnancies and citing an amicus brief from
the Guttmacher Institute); Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman,
Hobby Lobby’s Bitter Anniversary, BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2015), http://balkin.blogspot.
com/2015/06/hobby-lobbys-bitter-anniversary.html.
132 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 4, at 165 (calling Hobby Lobby an “easy case” and the
Court’s reasoning “highly straightforward” but focusing on the social phenomenon of disa-
greement over the holding).
133 See id. (situating the Hobby Lobby decision in wider culture-war debates); see also Eliz-
abeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L.
REV. F. 24 (2014) (responding to Horwitz).
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Still, doubts may remain about whether social coherentism really
answers skeptics who claim that no theory of religious freedom is possible,
and that legal decisions in this area will inevitably be irrational.  Answering
them depends on exactly how those doubts are understood.
D. Irrationality?
Section I.B explained how existing theories of religious freedom are
being charged with indeterminacy, ipse dixit-ism, and even irrationality.  Does
social coherentism fully answer those charges?  This Section begins by exam-
ining the meaning of the question about irrationality.  It isolates two possibili-
ties: one understanding of the question demands too much of any theory,
and the other is answered by social coherentism.  Next, the Section examines
an example.  A sophisticated and influential version of the critique has been
made by Steven Smith against Kent Greenawalt, as detailed above.  But it
turns out that instances of even arguable irrationality are rare.  Several of
Smith’s charges against Greenawalt do not qualify.  Even where they do
arguably pertain, moreover, accusations of irrationality miss their mark—the
decisions can claim to be rationally warranted in any sense that matters.
Finally, the Section urges that a profitable way to assess whether a method is
irrational is to ask about payoffs.  When that is done, two concerns turn out
to underlie the charge: bias and elitism.  Yet social coherentism is not dispro-
portionately subject to either of these, and actually it is relatively resistant to
both of them.
Whether irrationality afflicts social coherentism depends on what exactly
is meant by that charge.  Smith seems to have in mind a situation where two
resolutions of a constitutional problem, X and Y, are possible.  People differ
as to which they think is more defensible.  They give arguments for X and
arguments for Y, both of which seem reasonable, and in the end people sim-
ply choose the one they think better.  Does this actually happen?  And if so,
does it evince irrationality?
There are at least two ways to understand the accusation of irrationality
in religious freedom law.  First, you could understand it to be arguing that
the jurisprudence is not capable of determining discrete outcomes for all
religious freedom disputes.  So here the issue is whether social coherentism
gives us a way to choose X over Y definitively and for every actor in every
situation.
But that cannot be the question.  No theory of religious freedom, or of
constitutional law more generally, can determine every outcome in practice.
Not even theological approaches can do that.  Interpretation will be
required, and it will produce some disagreement simply because people dif-
ferently bear “the burdens of judgment.”134  Achieving or approaching an
134 RAWLS, PL, supra note 86, at 55–56.  For similar reasons, Dworkin was right to reject
what he called “external” skepticism and to take seriously only “internal” skepticism.
DWORKIN, supra note 85, at 79; see also SCANLON, supra note 77, at 86 n.27 (“Here I am in
agreement with Ronald Dworkin that only internal skepticism is worth worrying about.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 31  8-DEC-15 17:05
2015] religion  and  social  coherentism 393
equilibrium should give us some good reason to think that we can identify
determinate results for at least some disputes.  But it is unrealistic and unnec-
essary to ask for determinate outcomes in all cases.135
A second way to understand the question of rationality is whether consti-
tutional decisionmaking in this area can count as morally warranted or justi-
fied.  This is the sense in which the challenge of the skeptics is serious.  When
they say that legal actors make the choice between X and Y in a conclusory
way, they may mean that the choice itself is indefensible, however sophisti-
cated the preceding arguments supporting X and Y individually happen to
be.  And this difficulty is especially troubling, for the skeptics, when the con-
stitutional actor has the power to impose that choice on others who may not
share it.  Mere preferences or intuitions are not enough to justify a constitu-
tional understanding, especially when it is backed by state power.
Social coherentism answers this form of the charge of irrationality by
showing that the choice of X over Y can count as warranted.  When someone
decides that X rather than Y resonates with her other convictions about
proper resolutions to legal disputes, and with constitutional principles fairly
abstracted from those cases, then her choice of X over Y is rationally justified.
We can say that the person has reason to make that decision.  This is not
intuitionism—it grounds the choice between X and Y on a conviction of
coherence, and therefore on a claim of reasonableness that is subject to
argument.
Again, it is always possible that someone else could object that Y rather
than X coheres with all the relevant constitutional commitments.  That objec-
tion could take the form that support for X is reasonable but mistaken, per-
haps because it overlooks some precedent or principle, or it could take the
stronger form that a defense of X is so discontinuous with considered judg-
ments and established principles that it is in fact unwarranted.  Either way,
the two actors could have a conversation about how to best understand the
web of considered convictions, whether all the pertinent scenarios or princi-
ples are being taken into account, and whether each other’s claims of coher-
ence hold up.  They will try to convince one another.
However, the fact of debate itself does not defeat the argument that justi-
fication is possible.  That debaters can work to convince one another suggests
just the opposite, in fact.  People with conflicting intuitions can do little to
persuade one another, whereas people with different assessments of how
their judgments fit together can continue the conversation.
Moreover, the approach’s social aspect allows that Americans have an
opportunity to influence the government’s decisions on questions of consti-
tutional meaning.  Working through democratic mechanisms over time, citi-
zens can shift the range of accepted outcomes—the “Overton Window” of
135 SCANLON, supra note 77, at 78, 84, 104 (discussing reflective equilibrium and argu-
ing that “an overall account of a subject matter can provide assurance that some judgments
about it have determinate truth values”). But see id. at 85, 104 (arguing that it is not com-
pletely plausible to think that the domain of practical reasoning can be characterized so
that every normative claim within it has determinate truth value).
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constitutional meanings.136  Political responsiveness as to the meaning of the
Constitution helps to justify the imposition of one choice over another by
government.  Of course, lots of qualifiers must accompany this claim.  People
do not have equal access to political channels, and political or economic
interests can improperly influence their judgments.137  These distortions
must be resisted strenuously.  But effective popular influence also eases one
concern, namely that the reality of government coercion makes intolerable
the problem of indeterminacy.  Not only does a legal determination not need
to be unwarranted, but also it does not need to be unresponsive to popular
will.
A search for examples reveals that instances of arguable irrationality are
rare, and even Smith’s key illustrations do not involve unwarranted conclu-
sions.  Smith believes that Greenawalt is complacent “with respect to the
requirements of reason” and that he “makes virtually no effort to justify
either his general precepts or his array of particular conclusions.”138  Given
Greenawalt’s commitment to reason, that failure is remarkable and it says
more about the state of the general discourse on religious freedom than it
does about Greenawalt himself, according to Smith.139  All theories of relig-
ious freedom work under these discursive conditions, which generate propos-
als that “look like . . . thinly veiled exercise[s] in ipse dixit.”140
Smith gives a few examples of this failing in Greenawalt, but clear
instances are difficult to find.  One of Smith’s principal targets is Greena-
walt’s treatment of Good News Club,141 as mentioned above.142  Greenawalt
critiques the invalidation of an elementary school policy that disallowed a
Christian club for young children from meeting directly after school in the
building.143  Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, relied on earlier cases
holding that religious groups could not be singled out for exclusion from
136 The Overton Window: A Model of Policy Change, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y,
www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow (“Joseph Overton observed that in a given public pol-
icy area, such as education, only a relatively narrow range of potential policies will be con-
sidered politically acceptable.”); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of
Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitutional Theory Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1837 (1997)
(describing the difference between “taken for granted” constitutional ideas and “up for
grabs” arguments); Jack M. Balkin, From off the Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge
Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-main-
stream/258040 (describing how arguments once considered “off the wall” become “on the
wall” through contestation and argument).
137 Rawls was mostly worried about the influence of power and interests on judgments
of politics and morality, particularly judgments made on the basis of intuition.  His meth-
odology sought to expunge such influences, or at least dampen them. RAWLS, TOJ, supra
note 75, at 35.
138 Smith, supra note 26, at 1872.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1906.
141 Id. at 1893 (discussing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001)).
142 See supra text accompanying notes 38, 54.
143 GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 206.
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public facilities because doing so constituted impermissible viewpoint dis-
crimination against speech.144  Once the school opened its premises after
hours to community groups, on this approach, it could not deny access to
religious groups.145  Recall that Greenawalt distinguishes Good News Club
from these earlier cases on three grounds: it concerned impressionable ele-
mentary school students; Good News was an outside group seeking to evan-
gelize children, not an internal school club; and the meetings were to take
place immediately after the school day ended.146  Calling these “disturbing
features,” he concludes that the Court should have allowed school officials
the discretion to conclude that young students could have perceived official
endorsement of the club, and that children would have felt pressured to
attend such meetings, and might have urged their parents to allow them to
go, particularly if large numbers of their peers were attending.147
Does this decision count as irrational or conclusory?  Smith calls it a
“bald pronouncement[ ]” or something that “at least look[s] like” a bald pro-
nouncement.148  Given Greenawalt’s detailed reasoning, that characteriza-
tion is puzzling.  Earlier in the same book, Greenawalt lays out the non-
establishment values that inform his thinking about such cases.  Among them
is individual autonomy, by which he means freedom to choose free of official
compulsion, whether or not the choice is informed by conscience.  Govern-
ment interferes with this choice, and thus burdens autonomy, whenever it
“ ‘stacks the deck’ in favor of one religion or all religions.”149  Autonomy of
this sort explains his conclusions regarding Good News Club, and the case
helps to confirm the principle in a mutually reinforcing way.150  One might
not agree that non-establishment concerns should have prevailed in the case.
But mere disagreement is not enough to show that the conclusion amounts
to a bald pronouncement.
144 See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394
(1993).
145 Id. at 396–97.
146 GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 206.
147 Id.
148 Smith, supra note 26, at 1893.
149 GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 9.
150 Another example Smith admits is more complicated, and it involves not a judgment
about a case but a principle, is that government may not take positions on questions of
religious truth.  Smith, supra note 26, at 1893, 1894–95.  When he first announces it,
Greenawalt does not offer much to support this principle. GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at
57–58.  But much else in the book does undergird it, as argued above. See supra text
accompanying notes 99–107.  And in fact, Greenawalt cites it as perhaps the best example
of a precept that can in fact be supported by reasons.  Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 1144.
Still another of Smith’s examples is inapt.  He criticizes the argument that being forced to
support religion through taxation violates non-endorsement.  Smith, supra note 26, at
1897.  But Greenawalt acknowledges that the argument is weak when the taxes are not
specific to religious support, and he therefore does not rely on it. See GREENAWALT, supra
note 29, at 5, 8, 196.
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Probably Smith’s clearest example of intuitionism is Greenawalt’s discus-
sion of Lee v. Weisman,151 which involves prayer at a high school graduation
ceremony.152  On the one hand, free exercise values are implicated because
religious students and their families wish to solemnize a life event of tremen-
dous personal significance and to include a “transcendental dimension” to
the ceremony.153  On the other hand, dissenting students may experience
coercion precisely because the event is so significant that attendance is not
experienced as optional.  Even if standing or sitting silently does not commu-
nicate assent to the prayer, it could cause offense.154  Moreover, Justice Scalia
is wrong to think that such prayers are unifying, according to Greenawalt,
because Hindus and atheists may feel excluded even by the bland monotheis-
tic prayer that was in fact offered in the case, as might people who are Chris-
tian but who wish the prayer to be more overtly religious.155  Ultimately,
Greenawalt expresses “regret” that graduation prayer cannot be permitted,
but he concludes that “the principle of nonsponsorship of religion is impor-
tant enough to justify the Court’s determination that even these prayers are
unconstitutional,” and that conclusion holds regardless of whether they are
officially sponsored by the school.156  In a later piece, Greenawalt returns to
school graduation, offering it as his leading example of a genuine value
conflict.157
So the case of graduation prayer is hard.  After asking “[h]ow does our
reason really work?,” Greenawalt contends, again, that reason cannot get him
all the way to his conclusion in that case—he says, “I do not believe there is
some process of reasons that settles which side is stronger. . . . [A]ll I can
honestly say is that the reasons on one side seem to be stronger than the
reasons on the other.”158  Here, he sounds strikingly like Smith himself, as
noted above.159  Both thinkers believe that reasons cannot dictate the out-
come.  But is that all there is to say?
Actually, reasons do support Greenawalt’s conclusion about Lee.  First of
all, the holding complements what is probably the central non-establishment
tenet for Greenawalt, namely the principle against government endorsement
of religious truth.  And, again, that principle itself harmonizes with several
constitutional commitments that are virtually uncontroverted among Ameri-
151 GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 111.
152 Given the strength of the example, it is notable that Smith actually offers it not as an
example of conclusory argument, but for a different observation, namely that Greenawalt
is charitable to religious people who wind up on the other side of his conclusions.  Smith,
supra note 26, at 1894 (quoting GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 113 n.40).  Greenawalt
notes that religious students and their families want “to acknowledge God and seek God’s
blessing.” GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 113 n.40.
153 GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 111.
154 Id. at 112.
155 Id. at 114.
156 Id. at 115.
157 Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 1144.
158 Id.
159 See supra text accompanying note 64.
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cans.160  Moreover, the ban on graduation prayer derives support from
Greenawalt’s conclusion that other ceremonial invocations of religion are
similarly inappropriate, such as inclusion of the phrase “under God” in the
Pledge of Allegiance—a practice that is acceptable, for him, only because
overturning it at this stage would be impracticable.161  A footnote points the
reader to other discussions to bolster the proposition that favoring religious
believers generally over nonbelievers can constitute endorsement of relig-
ion.162  Finally, as Justice Kennedy himself emphasizes, the holding is consis-
tent with the general principle barring coercive observance.163  From the
perspective of social coherentism, a conclusion in favor of Lee v. Weisman is
warranted.  And that is true even if the method could not eliminate indeter-
minacy in the case, because other commentators could find reasons to reach
the opposite conclusion.
Greenawalt acknowledges the impact of his own social location on his
judgments—factors like his “cultural heritage, particular upbringing, and
professional training,” as well his personal religious affiliation and his father’s
liberalism both on internal church governance and on church-state rela-
tions.164  He mentions these factors in order to confess the influence of sub-
jective factors on his conclusions.  Yet from the perspective of social
constitutionalism, those influences are benign.  They allow public conversa-
tions about constitutional principles to shape the understandings of free
exercise and non-establishment that matter in consequential moments of
decision on questions like the constitutional propriety of graduation prayer.
Yet, they are appropriate only if and after they are subject to rigorous testing
through a process like the one Greenawalt actually uses.
Of course this discussion will not settle the question for everyone.  A
large literature exists on the nature of rationality, and it provides resources
for arguing that such conclusions do not qualify as rational.165  In addition to
engaging that debate, as this Section has, we also should ask about payoffs for
a theory of religious freedom.  What turns on whether a decision is rational?
Digging deeper, two concerns seem to be driving the charge that theories of
religious freedom trade in unreason.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 100–08.
161 Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 1143.
162 GREENAWALT, supra note 29, at 113 n.38.
163 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587–88 (1992) (“It is beyond dispute that, at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support
or participate in religion or its exercise . . . [and here] subtle coercive pressures
exist[ed,] . . . . [T]he student had no real alternative which would have allowed her to
avoid the fact or appearance of participation.”).
164 Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 1144–45.
165 Cf., e.g., Raz, supra note 84, at 313 n.71 (rejecting the idea that a moral choice is
unreasoned simply because a reason cannot be given for preferring that choice over all
others, because there are reasons to support the chosen policy); see also Elinor Mason,
Value Pluralism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/value-pluralism/ (describing this
debate and citing sources).
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One concern is bias.  That must be what is driving Smith when he
observes that some pluralists consistently generate progressive outcomes.166
Elsewhere he says, “the tradition seems to be ailing” and “[p]olemic, invec-
tive, and sophistry abound.”167  Reason has the potential to check those evils,
he implies, but it is failing to do so under contemporary conditions.168  Sec-
ond, there is a concern with arbitrariness, which compromises the rule of
law.  A combination of these two worries may be driving the claim that there
is no available theory of religious freedom—that making sense of decisions in
this area is impossible.169  Consider them in turn.
Bias is a familiar charge against coherentism, actually.  Critics writing in
philosophy likewise have worried that coherentism is voluntaristic, meaning
it places too much faith in the ability of individuals to construct coherent
worldviews.  Not only bias, but also epistemic defects such as memory failure
or incompetence can affect that process.170  Doubtless that is right.  Yet
acknowledgement of those problems does not detract from the claim that
coherence describes the conditions for justification—it only affects how easy
it is to achieve that state.  Moreover, there is no reason to think that the
approach is disproportionately subject to bias or any other cognitive defect.171
At least coherentist methods work to systematically expose bias and error,
subjecting them to critique and reflection.172
Furthermore, there is good reason to think that coherentism in its social
form is even less susceptible to bias than the conventional version.  If the
166 Smith, supra note 26, at 1890–91.
167 Id. at 1871 (“[T]he tradition [of discourse on religious freedom] seems to be ailing.
Probably the most common adjective used in descriptions of the contemporary jurispru-
dence of religious freedom is incoherent.  Polemic, invective, and sophistry abound.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
168 Id. (“What the tradition desperately needs, it seems, is . . . a careful, systematic
demonstration that controversies over religious freedom can actually be resolved through
‘reasoned analysis, as distinguished from rhetoric.’”).  At one point, Smith is discussing the
historical pedigree of the rule against government pronouncements on questions of relig-
ious truth.  After noting that Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln all violated the rule, he
asks whether perhaps more recent history supports it:
But tradition is an evolving matter, and in our more secular and diverse society,
we understand that such expressions are divisive and inappropriate.  Don’t we?
Well, actually, no: we don’t—not unless the “we” is understood to refer to a
smaller and more select fellowship (like, say, devout readers of the New York
Times?).
Id. at 1900 (footnote omitted).
169 SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 8; Smith, supra note 26, at 1901.
170 Daniels, supra note 14; Raz, supra note 84, at 282.
171 And this is not just a product of secular modernity.  Theological approaches also
suffer from such limitations.  Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 1145 (“I would not do better if I
directly employed my religious convictions.  They do not typically yield more decisive
answers . . . .”).
172 See Daniels, supra note 14; Sayre-McCord, supra note 75, at 141 (arguing that the
“underlying idea” is that we “subject our evaluative attitudes to the pressures of
reflection”).
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argument in Section B is correct, then social and political forces work not
just to warp conclusions arrived at from a perspective of power or with partic-
ular interests, but they also limit the range of available understandings of
religious freedom that may be seen as authoritative in any given time and
place, and they give social movements opportunities to impact constitutional
meanings.
Second, coherentism does not necessarily generate arbitrariness, even if
different actors will arrive at different conclusions.173  There is a difference
between noticing the diversity of individual judgments and saying that their
choices are arbitrary.174  Given the choice, Greenawalt will rule against the
government in the graduation case every time.  Moreover, to say that it is
hard to know how someone else will come down is not necessarily to say that
person’s decision is arbitrary.  Difficult cases will persist—it is impossible to
imagine any approach that could eliminate them, including theological ones.
Rule of law concerns will not disappear.175  But recognizing the social con-
straints on decisions mitigates those dangers substantially.  And coherentism
gives us substantial confidence that at least some decisions are determinate,
and that many others can be defended as rationally justified and in that sense
not arbitrary.
E. Individualism or Inconclusiveness?
Coherentism has drawn several characteristic objections, some of which
pertain specifically to its use in law.  First, the method is thought to be too
individualized.  On this argument, each person can arrive at his or her own
understanding, which he or she can claim is justified as long as it hangs
together.  The theory may therefore lack the resources to condemn positions
that are internally consistent but wrongheaded.176  Law in particular cannot
operate in a fragmented manner—it must be generally applicable in order to
173 RAWLS, PL, supra note 86, at 55–56 (“[T]he sources of reasonable disagreement—
the burdens of judgment—among reasonable persons are the many hazards involved in
the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the
ordinary course of political life.”).
174 Raz, supra note 84, at 313 n.71.  Again, this difference tracks the distinction urged
by Schwartzman and Gaus between intra-personal indeterminacy, which is avoidable, and
inter-personal indeterminacy, which is unavoidable and generates uncertainty in legal out-
comes. See supra note 21.
175 Compare the view of Raz, who insists that “social politics” will result in moral incon-
sistency, because more than one perspective will be written into doctrine.  Raz, supra note
84, at 310–11.  As shown in the next Section, social coherentism is compatible with much
of what Raz says, although it is agnostic on his objection to views that the law should be
conceptualized as a coherent whole.  Whatever the truth of those views, this Essay argues
only that constitutional actors are engaged in a shared project of arguing over the meaning
of the First Amendment.
176 Id. at 280 (“[I]t is simply false that we hold as justified beliefs conceived in prejudice
and superstition, or entertained because of gullibility, obstinacy, or similar cognitive
defects of the believer.  The racist’s belief in the untrustworthiness of members of a certain
race, bred of prejudice, is not justified even if it coheres best with all the racist’s other
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 38  8-DEC-15 17:05
400 notre dame law review [vol. 91:1
serve rule-of-law values.177  Second is the fear that coherentism is inconclu-
sive.178  Because conceptions of law are always open to new conclusions
based on new disputes in the real world, people’s equilibriums are continu-
ally in flux.  Third and last, coherentism is accused of excessive voluntarism,
meaning that it puts too much faith in the ability of individuals to make sense
of their moral worlds—here, specifically, the legal domain.179  Social coher-
entism offers responses to all three of these objections.
In the philosophy literature, there are two typical responses to those
problems.  First is to say that coherentism offers only a theory of moral justifi-
cation and not a theory of moral truth or knowledge.  Therefore, it does not
say anything about whether an individual’s worldview is true or worthwhile in
some absolute sense, only that the person is justified in holding it.  This
response is intellectually defensible—and this Essay has adopted the distinc-
tion180—but also somewhat unsatisfying for religious freedom or constitu-
tional law.181  When we say that someone’s reading of free exercise or non-
establishment is justified, we mean something more than that it is coherent
internally.  For example, a white supremacist interpretation of the Constitu-
tion might be believed to hang together but is unwarranted.182  So this
answer is too modest.
A second response among philosophers is to say that coherentism does
provide a theory of truth.  Someone’s claim that their interpretation of relig-
ious freedom is coherent means not only that it is justified given their per-
spective but also that it must be true for everyone, everywhere.  Yet a difficulty
with absolute or ethical-realist philosophies of religious freedom is that none
has succeeded in winning a consensus.  Moreover, most people do not expect
truth from a legal system—they understand that there are multiple ways to
arrange a constitutional order, and that saying such an order makes sense183
is not the same thing as saying that its conception of political morality is the
only true one.184  Finally, absolute justification is not needed to construct a
theory of legal reasoning that can attractively depict how constitutional actors
(mostly racist) beliefs.”); see also Sayre-McCord, supra note 75, at 170 (noting the preva-
lence of a version of this objection).
177 See Raz, supra note 84, at 313.
178 See Lyons, supra note 75, at 146.
179 See Raz, supra note 84, at 282.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 93–95.
181 For example, Raz thinks that coherentism cannot work for law because it lacks a
“base” that can draw together individuals’ coherent views together in one legal system.
Raz, supra note 84, at 284. But see Balkin, supra note 91, at 128 (critiquing Raz on the
ground that there are many different perspectives from which to seek coherence).
182 See Raz, supra note 84, at 280.  Jack Balkin believes that truth claims place wide
boundaries on coherentist accounts.  Balkin, supra note 91, at 120–21.  Even if a legal
understanding is consistent, for him, it cannot claim to be reasonable if it relies on an
interpretation of principle that is false in an absolute sense.
183 Cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 114, at 10–11 (defining “makes sense” as a category of
historical understanding).
184 Balkin, supra note 91, at 118.
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come to understand and construct doctrines.  Ungrounded accounts can do
the job.  So, moral absolutism does not seem to be the best way to answer the
criticisms of coherentism.
Social coherentism offers an intermediate solution.  It holds that in
order for an actor’s conception of law to be coherent, it must account for
uncontroverted features of a constitutional culture.185  Constitutional law
arises out of conversations and contests that citizens have with one another in
a particular social location and moment.  Those contingencies set outer
boundaries on the understandings of religious freedom, even ones that are
internally consistent.  So while someone from Great Britain could construct a
coherent understanding of religious freedom that included an established
religion, it would not count as an interpretation of American constitutional-
ism.186  Nor would the white supremacist’s understanding of equality count.
Social coherentism thus avoids both the individualism of formal coher-
entism and the absolutism of moral ontology.  Rather than either of these, it
describes a way of interpreting and constructing law that is intersubjective.187
Moreover, it is dynamic and historical, contemplating constant revision.  At
the same time, social coherentism modulates rapid oscillations from passing
trends or quotidian politics.188
This method is particularly appropriate for constitutional law.  American
constitutionalism aspires to be democratically responsive, so that a key com-
ponent of its legitimacy is that it resonates with society, politics, and culture.
It stakes its legitimacy chiefly on its acceptability to the political body over
time.  That responsiveness means that it is revisable (rather than static) and it
means that it allows for specificity (rather than suitability to all nations).  Yet
it also preserves the rule of law.
185 Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 85, at 66–68 (articulating a criterion of fit); see also supra
note 92 (noting differences between social coherentism and Dworkin’s approach).
186 Thanks to Adam Kolber for this hypothetical. Cf. LEITER, supra note 25, at 116–30
(arguing that an established church might be acceptable, if one argues from first princi-
ples of liberal democracy).
187 Beauchamp and Childress adopt the method of reflective equilibrium for moral
justification, but they believe that reflective equilibrium cannot defend against the charge
of individualism or relativism without some grounding that does not itself depend on
coherence.  They say,
We cannot justify every moral judgment in terms of another moral judgment
without generating an infinite regress or vicious circle of justification in which no
judgment is justified. The way to escape this regress is to accept some judgments
as justified without dependence on other judgments.
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 88, at 385.  They suggest that a “common morality”
can ground the method of reflective equilibrium in this way. Id.  Social coherentism, by
contrast, proceeds without any such foundation.  It argues that justification can avoid the
problem of individualism by reference to intersubjective convictions, without more.
188 Dynamism is an asset of the theory, not a liability. Cf. Lyons, supra note 75, at 146
(“[N]o coherence argument can be conclusive.”).  Democratic responsiveness demands
that closely contested constitutional principles remain in flux, at least in principle (even
though others will be relatively entrenched).
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Putting all of this together, there emerges a depiction of complex delib-
eration in constitutional law.  Constitutional actors properly strive for coher-
ence.  They seek to make decisions that fit with their principles and paradigm
outcomes.  Working back and forth, they analyze new situations in light of
that existing constellation, and they revise elements of it when necessary.
They do so informed by, and in conversation with, the wider constitutional
culture, assessing its features and seeking to convince one another to alter
them where necessary to achieve a more workable and just society.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that decisions on questions of religious freedom
can be rationally justified.  Social coherentism offers a method for resolving
disputes in a way that can generate warranted outcomes, even though it may
require assimilating plural principles and analogizing to multiple judgments
in other cases.  Moreover, these decisions can be rationally justified despite
the fact that they are embedded within, and shaped by, social and political
contests over the proper meaning and implementation of the First
Amendment.
Without an account like the one provided by social coherentism, skep-
tics may be inclined to convince decisionmakers that questions of religious
freedom are incapable of principled resolution and should be left to the
political process, at least to a greater degree than they currently are.189  And
the Supreme Court seems to be heeding that call, partly by eliminating the
standing of plaintiffs to bring Establishment Clause challenges.190
Beyond the question of institutional competence, skeptics are pressing
against the possibility of making arguments of constitutional principle in any
forum—not only in the courts, but also in legislatures, executive agencies,
and elsewhere.191  That would abandon religious minorities to the vagaries of
local power across large swaths of America.  Pluralist thinkers have not yet
provided a defense against charges of irrationality and indeterminacy.
This Essay has provided such a defense in the method of social coherent-
ism.  Although nothing about the approach demands progressive outcomes,
189 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 68 (arguing that the rejection of a principled
approach to religious freedom suggests that courts should play a more modest role, gener-
ally, though acknowledging that determining how modest will require additional, compli-
cated jurisprudential considerations); Richard W. Garnett, Judicial Review, Local Values, and
Pluralism, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 6 (2009) (critiquing judicial review for “homogen-
ize[ing] community norms”).
190 See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
191 See SMITH, supra note 43, at 67–68 (“[A] prudential approach could admit that con-
stitutional law—and thus judges, lawyers, and legal scholars—probably have no more than
a modest contribution to make to the realization of religious freedom.”); id. at 79 (“I have
suggested that there are no satisfactory principles of religious freedom.  If I am right, the
most obvious consequence is that in this area courts cannot act on the basis of genuine
principles.  But there is another less obvious but perhaps more interesting consequence:
no one else—not a legislature, not a school board—can act on the basis of genuine princi-
ples of religious freedom either.”).
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it grounds them in an attractive approach.  First, it resists the argument,
which is surprisingly widespread, that only theological understandings of free
exercise and non-establishment work to support the doctrine.192  Moreover,
it provides an understanding of moral justification that can be free from
religious precepts.
And finally, its social aspect keeps the approach responsive to constitu-
tional arguments from across the full range of political actors, and to diverse
sorts of historical dynamics.  It allows coherentism to incorporate the insight
that constitutional meanings cohere and change in conversation with demo-
cratic politics, not outside them.  And it provides a way of appreciating
exactly how those social influences properly impact decisions by individual
legal actors.  For all these reasons, social coherentism provides an approach
to religious freedom that is capable of responding to skeptics.
192 See supra note 4 (citing sources).
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